System and method for securely configuring a new device with network credentials

ABSTRACT

A system, apparatus, and method for sharing network credentials. One embodiment of a method comprises: establishing a Bluetooth connection between a first Internet of Things (IoT) device and a mobile device of a first user having an IoT app installed, the mobile device to couple the first IoT device to an IoT service; receiving a request from a user from the mobile device to configure the first IoT device using network credentials from a second IoT device, the second IoT device registered with an account of the user on the IoT service and configured to connect to a secure network of the user with the network credentials; establishing a communication channel between the first IoT device and the second IoT device through the IoT service and the mobile device to obtain the network credentials; and using the network credentials at the first IoT device to securely connect to the secure network.

BACKGROUND Field of the Invention

This invention relates generally to the field of computer systems. Moreparticularly, the invention relates to a system and method for securelyconfiguring a new device with network credentials.

Description of the Related Art

The “Internet of Things” refers to the interconnection ofuniquely-identifiable embedded devices within the Internetinfrastructure. Ultimately, IoT is expected to result in new,wide-ranging types of applications in which virtually any type ofphysical thing may provide information about itself or its surroundingsand/or may be controlled remotely via client devices over the Internet.

When user get new WiFi-enabled device, such as an IoT device thatsupports WiFi, a process of registration between the new device and theuser home network needs to be executed. This process can be painful ifthe user does not remember the WiFi credentials or if the device is outof the WiFi coverage area. Furthermore, if the device is within thecoverage edge of the WiFi network the registration will fail because thelow coverage condition will corrupt the process of registration whichwill result in the access point rejecting the registration of the newdevice. The problem is more complicated for users who have multiple WiFinetworks inside their home or business. In these circumstances, eachnetwork will require its own registration process.

Finally, a user cannot establish the registration of the new devicewithout being inside the home or business that hosts the privatenetwork. Consequently, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) areunable to send a device to a user that is ready to connect to their WiFinetworks out of the box.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

A better understanding of the present invention can be obtained from thefollowing detailed description in conjunction with the followingdrawings, in which:

FIGS. 1A-B illustrates different embodiments of an IoT systemarchitecture;

FIG. 2 illustrates an IoT device in accordance with one embodiment ofthe invention;

FIG. 3 illustrates an IoT hub in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention;

FIGS. 4A-B illustrate embodiments of the invention for controlling andcollecting data from IoT devices, and generating notifications;

FIG. 5 illustrates embodiments of the invention for collecting data fromIoT devices and generating notifications from an IoT hub and/or IoTservice;

FIG. 6 illustrates embodiments of the invention which implementsimproved security techniques such as encryption and digital signatures;

FIG. 7 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture in which asubscriber identity module (SIM) is used to store keys on IoT devices;

FIG. 8A illustrates one embodiment in which IoT devices are registeredusing barcodes or QR codes;

FIG. 8B illustrates one embodiment in which pairing is performed usingbarcodes or QR codes;

FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of a method for programming a SIMusing an IoT hub;

FIG. 10 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering an IoTdevice with an IoT hub and IoT service;

FIG. 11 illustrates one embodiment of a method for encrypting data to betransmitted to an IoT device;

FIG. 12 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture for collecting andstoring network credentials;

FIG. 13 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture for registering auser with a wireless access point;

FIG. 14 illustrates one embodiment of a method for collecting andstoring network credentials;

FIG. 15 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering a newdevice using stored credentials;

FIGS. 16A-B illustrate different embodiments of the invention forencrypting data between an IoT service and an IoT device;

FIG. 17 illustrates embodiments of the invention for performing a securekey exchange, generating a common secret, and using the secret togenerate a key stream;

FIG. 18 illustrates a packet structure in accordance with one embodimentof the invention;

FIG. 19 illustrates techniques employed in one embodiment for writingand reading data to/from an IoT device without formally pairing with theIoT device;

FIG. 20 illustrates an exemplary set of command packets employed in oneembodiment of the invention;

FIG. 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions using commandpackets;

FIG. 22 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention;

FIGS. 23A-C illustrate a method for secure pairing in accordance withone embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 24 illustrates one embodiment of a system for configuring an IoThub with WiFi security data;

FIG. 25 illustrates a system architecture employed in one embodiment ofthe invention;

FIG. 26 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention;

FIG. 27 illustrates one embodiment of a master IoT hub comprising a WiFirouter, with authentication logic and a firewall;

FIG. 28 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention;

FIG. 29 illustrates one embodiment of the invention using an associationID;

FIG. 30 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention;

FIG. 31 illustrates one embodiment with different types of attributes;

FIG. 32 illustrates one embodiment for securely sharing WiFicredentials; and

FIG. 33 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerousspecific details are set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the embodiments of the invention described below. Itwill be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that theembodiments of the invention may be practiced without some of thesespecific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devicesare shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring the underlyingprinciples of the embodiments of the invention.

One embodiment of the invention comprises an Internet of Things (IoT)platform which may be utilized by developers to design and build new IoTdevices and applications. In particular, one embodiment includes a basehardware/software platform for IoT devices including a predefinednetworking protocol stack and an IoT hub through which the IoT devicesare coupled to the Internet. In addition, one embodiment includes an IoTservice through which the IoT hubs and connected IoT devices may beaccessed and managed as described below. In addition, one embodiment ofthe IoT platform includes an IoT app or Web application (e.g., executedon a client device) to access and configured the IoT service, hub andconnected devices. Existing online retailers and other Website operatorsmay leverage the IoT platform described herein to readily provide uniqueIoT functionality to existing user bases.

FIG. 1A illustrates an overview of an architectural platform on whichembodiments of the invention may be implemented. In particular, theillustrated embodiment includes a plurality of IoT devices 101-105communicatively coupled over local communication channels 130 to acentral IoT hub 110 which is itself communicatively coupled to an IoTservice 120 over the Internet 220. Each of the IoT devices 101-105 mayinitially be paired to the IoT hub 110 (e.g., using the pairingtechniques described below) in order to enable each of the localcommunication channels 130. In one embodiment, the IoT service 120includes an end user database 122 for maintaining user accountinformation and data collected from each user's IoT devices. Forexample, if the IoT devices include sensors (e.g., temperature sensors,accelerometers, heat sensors, motion detectore, etc), the database 122may be continually updated to store the data collected by the IoTdevices 101-105. The data stored in the database 122 may then be madeaccessible to the end user via the IoT app or browser installed on theuser's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) andto web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the IoTservice 120).

The IoT devices 101-105 may be equipped with various types of sensors tocollect information about themselves and their surroundings and providethe collected information to the IoT service 120, user devices 135and/or external Websites 130 via the IoT hub 110. Some of the IoTdevices 101-105 may perform a specified function in response to controlcommands sent through the IoT hub 110. Various specific examples ofinformation collected by the IoT devices 101-105 and control commandsare provided below. In one embodiment described below, the IoT device101 is a user input device designed to record user selections and sendthe user selections to the IoT service 120 and/or Website.

In one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 includes a cellular radio toestablish a connection to the Internet 220 via a cellular service 115such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.Alternatively, or in addition, the IoT hub 110 may include a WiFi radioto establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 116which couples the IoT hub 110 to the Internet (e.g., via an InternetService Provider providing Internet service to the end user). Of course,it should be noted that the underlying principles of the invention arenot limited to any particular type of communication channel or protocol.

In one embodiment, the IoT devices 101-105 are ultra low-power devicescapable of operating for extended periods of time on battery power(e.g., years). To conserve power, the local communication channels 130may be implemented using a low-power wireless communication technologysuch as Bluetooth Low Energy (LE). In this embodiment, each of the IoTdevices 101-105 and the IoT hub 110 are equipped with Bluetooth LEradios and protocol stacks.

As mentioned, in one embodiment, the IoT platform includes an IoT app orWeb application executed on user devices 135 to allow users to accessand configure the connected IoT devices 101-105, IoT hub 110, and/or IoTservice 120. In one embodiment, the app or web application may bedesigned by the operator of a Website 130 to provide IoT functionalityto its user base. As illustrated, the Website may maintain a userdatabase 131 containing account records related to each user.

FIG. 1B illustrates additional connection options for a plurality of IoThubs 110-111, 190 In this embodiment a single user may have multiplehubs 110-111 installed onsite at a single user premises 180 (e.g., theuser's home or business). This may be done, for example, to extend thewireless range needed to connect all of the IoT devices 101-105. Asindicated, if a user has multiple hubs 110, 111 they may be connectedvia a local communication channel (e.g., Wifi, Ethernet, Power LineNetworking, etc). In one embodiment, each of the hubs 110-111 mayestablish a direct connection to the IoT service 120 through a cellular115 or WiFi 116 connection (not explicitly shown in FIG. 1B).Alternatively, or in addition, one of the IoT hubs such as IoT hub 110may act as a “master” hub which provides connectivity and/or localservices to all of the other IoT hubs on the user premises 180, such asIoT hub 111 (as indicated by the dotted line connecting IoT hub 110 andIoT hub 111). For example, the master IoT hub 110 may be the only IoThub to establish a direct connection to the IoT service 120. In oneembodiment, only the “master” IoT hub 110 is equipped with a cellularcommunication interface to establish the connection to the IoT service120. As such, all communication between the IoT service 120 and theother IoT hubs 111 will flow through the master IoT hub 110. In thisrole, the master IoT hub 110 may be provided with additional programcode to perform filtering operations on the data exchanged between theother IoT hubs 111 and IoT service 120 (e.g., servicing some datarequests locally when possible).

Regardless of how the IoT hubs 110-111 are connected, in one embodiment,the IoT service 120 will logically associate the hubs with the user andcombine all of the attached IoT devices 101-105 under a singlecomprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with theinstalled app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).

In this embodiment, the master IoT hub 110 and one or more slave IoThubs 111 may connect over a local network which may be a WiFi network116, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC)networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run throughthe user's power lines). In addition, to the IoT hubs 110-111, each ofthe IoT devices 101-105 may be interconnected with the IoT hubs 110-111using any type of local network channel such as WiFi, Ethernet, PLC, orBluetooth LE, to name a few.

FIG. 1B also shows an IoT hub 190 installed at a second user premises181. A virtually unlimited number of such IoT hubs 190 may be installedand configured to collect data from IoT devices 191-192 at user premisesaround the world. In one embodiment, the two user premises 180-181 maybe configured for the same user. For example, one user premises 180 maybe the user's primary home and the other user premises 181 may be theuser's vacation home. In such a case, the IoT service 120 will logicallyassociate the IoT hubs 110-111, 190 with the user and combine all of theattached IoT devices 101-105, 191-192 under a single comprehensive userinterface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135(and/or a browser-based interface).

As illustrated in FIG. 2, an exemplary embodiment of an IoT device 101includes a memory 210 for storing program code and data 201-203 and alow power microcontroller 200 for executing the program code andprocessing the data. The memory 210 may be a volatile memory such asdynamic random access memory (DRAM) or may be a non-volatile memory suchas Flash memory. In one embodiment, a non-volatile memory may be usedfor persistent storage and a volatile memory may be used for executionof the program code and data at runtime. Moreover, the memory 210 may beintegrated within the low power microcontroller 200 or may be coupled tothe low power microcontroller 200 via a bus or communication fabric. Theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particularimplementation of the memory 210.

As illustrated, the program code may include application program code203 defining an application-specific set of functions to be performed bythe IoT device 201 and library code 202 comprising a set of predefinedbuilding blocks which may be utilized by the application developer ofthe IoT device 101. In one embodiment, the library code 202 comprises aset of basic functions required to implement an IoT device such as acommunication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between eachIoT device 101 and the IoT hub 110. As mentioned, in one embodiment, thecommunication protocol stack 201 comprises a Bluetooth LE protocolstack. In this embodiment, Bluetooth LE radio and antenna 207 may beintegrated within the low power microcontroller 200. However, theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particularcommunication protocol.

The particular embodiment shown in FIG. 2 also includes a plurality ofinput devices or sensors 210 to receive user input and provide the userinput to the low power microcontroller, which processes the user inputin accordance with the application code 203 and library code 202. In oneembodiment, each of the input devices include an LED 209 to providefeedback to the end user.

In addition, the illustrated embodiment includes a battery 208 forsupplying power to the low power microcontroller. In one embodiment, anon-chargeable coin cell battery is used. However, in an alternateembodiment, an integrated rechargeable battery may be used (e.g.,rechargeable by connecting the IoT device to an AC power supply (notshown)).

A speaker 205 is also provided for generating audio. In one embodiment,the low power microcontroller 299 includes audio decoding logic fordecoding a compressed audio stream (e.g., such as an MPEG-4/AdvancedAudio Coding (AAC) stream) to generate audio on the speaker 205.Alternatively, the low power microcontroller 200 and/or the applicationcode/data 203 may include digitally sampled snippets of audio to provideverbal feedback to the end user as the user enters selections via theinput devices 210.

In one embodiment, one or more other/alternate I/O devices or sensors250 may be included on the IoT device 101 based on the particularapplication for which the IoT device 101 is designed. For example, anenvironmental sensor may be included to measure temperature, pressure,humidity, etc. A security sensor and/or door lock opener may be includedif the IoT device is used as a security device. Of course, theseexamples are provided merely for the purposes of illustration. Theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particulartype of IoT device. In fact, given the highly programmable nature of thelow power microcontroller 200 equipped with the library code 202, anapplication developer may readily develop new application code 203 andnew I/O devices 250 to interface with the low power microcontroller forvirtually any type of IoT application.

In one embodiment, the low power microcontroller 200 also includes asecure key store for storing encryption keys for encryptingcommunications and/or generating signatures. Alternatively, the keys maybe secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).

A wakeup receiver 207 is included in one embodiment to wake the IoTdevice from an ultra low power state in which it is consuming virtuallyno power. In one embodiment, the wakeup receiver 207 is configured tocause the IoT device 101 to exit this low power state in response to awakeup signal received from a wakeup transmitter 307 configured on theIoT hub 110 as shown in FIG. 3. In particular, in one embodiment, thetransmitter 307 and receiver 207 together form an electrical resonanttransformer circuit such as a Tesla coil. In operation, energy istransmitted via radio frequency signals from the transmitter 307 to thereceiver 207 when the hub 110 needs to wake the IoT device 101 from avery low power state. Because of the energy transfer, the IoT device 101may be configured to consume virtually no power when it is in its lowpower state because it does not need to continually “listen” for asignal from the hub (as is the case with network protocols which allowdevices to be awakened via a network signal). Rather, themicrocontroller 200 of the IoT device 101 may be configured to wake upafter being effectively powered down by using the energy electricallytransmitted from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207.

As illustrated in FIG. 3, the IoT hub 110 also includes a memory 317 forstoring program code and data 305 and hardware logic 301 such as amicrocontroller for executing the program code and processing the data.A wide area network (WAN) interface 302 and antenna 310 couple the IoThub 110 to the cellular service 115. Alternatively, as mentioned above,the IoT hub 110 may also include a local network interface (not shown)such as a WiFi interface (and WiFi antenna) or Ethernet interface forestablishing a local area network communication channel. In oneembodiment, the hardware logic 301 also includes a secure key store forstoring encryption keys for encrypting communications andgenerating/verifying signatures. Alternatively, the keys may be securedin a subscriber identify module (SIM).

A local communication interface 303 and antenna 311 establishes localcommunication channels with each of the IoT devices 101-105. Asmentioned above, in one embodiment, the local communication interface303/antenna 311 implements the Bluetooth LE standard. However, theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particularprotocols for establishing the local communication channels with the IoTdevices 101-105. Although illustrated as separate units in FIG. 3, theWAN interface 302 and/or local communication interface 303 may beembedded within the same chip as the hardware logic 301.

In one embodiment, the program code and data includes a communicationprotocol stack 308 which may include separate stacks for communicatingover the local communication interface 303 and the WAN interface 302. Inaddition, device pairing program code and data 306 may be stored in thememory to allow the IoT hub to pair with new IoT devices. In oneembodiment, each new IoT device 101-105 is assigned a unique code whichis communicated to the IoT hub 110 during the pairing process. Forexample, the unique code may be embedded in a barcode on the IoT deviceand may be read by the barcode reader 106 or may be communicated overthe local communication channel 130. In an alternate embodiment, theunique ID code is embedded magnetically on the IoT device and the IoThub has a magnetic sensor such as an radio frequency ID (RFID) or nearfield communication (NFC) sensor to detect the code when the IoT device101 is moved within a few inches of the IoT hub 110.

In one embodiment, once the unique ID has been communicated, the IoT hub110 may verify the unique ID by querying a local database (not shown),performing a hash to verify that the code is acceptable, and/orcommunicating with the IoT service 120, user device 135 and/or Website130 to validate the ID code. Once validated, in one embodiment, the IoThub 110 pairs the IoT device 101 and stores the pairing data in memory317 (which, as mentioned, may include non-volatile memory). Once pairingis complete, the IoT hub 110 may connect with the IoT device 101 toperform the various IoT functions described herein.

In one embodiment, the organization running the IoT service 120 mayprovide the IoT hub 110 and a basic hardware/software platform to allowdevelopers to easily design new IoT services. In particular, in additionto the IoT hub 110, developers may be provided with a softwaredevelopment kit (SDK) to update the program code and data 305 executedwithin the hub 110. In addition, for IoT devices 101, the SDK mayinclude an extensive set of library code 202 designed for the base IoThardware (e.g., the low power microcontroller 200 and other componentsshown in FIG. 2) to facilitate the design of various different types ofapplications 101. In one embodiment, the SDK includes a graphical designinterface in which the developer needs only to specify input and outputsfor the IoT device. All of the networking code, including thecommunication stack 201 that allows the IoT device 101 to connect to thehub 110 and the service 120, is already in place for the developer. Inaddition, in one embodiment, the SDK also includes a library code baseto facilitate the design of apps for mobile devices (e.g., iPhone andAndroid devices).

In one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 manages a continuous bi-directionalstream of data between the IoT devices 101-105 and the IoT service 120.In circumstances where updates to/from the IoT devices 101-105 arerequired in real time (e.g., where a user needs to view the currentstatus of security devices or environmental readings), the IoT hub maymaintain an open TCP socket to provide regular updates to the userdevice 135 and/or external Websites 130. The specific networkingprotocol used to provide updates may be tweaked based on the needs ofthe underlying application. For example, in some cases, where may notmake sense to have a continuous bi-directional stream, a simplerequest/response protocol may be used to gather information when needed.

In one embodiment, both the IoT hub 110 and the IoT devices 101-105 areautomatically upgradeable over the network. In particular, when a newupdate is available for the IoT hub 110 it may automatically downloadand install the update from the IoT service 120. It may first copy theupdated code into a local memory, run and verify the update beforeswapping out the older program code. Similarly, when updates areavailable for each of the IoT devices 101-105, they may initially bedownloaded by the IoT hub 110 and pushed out to each of the IoT devices101-105. Each IoT device 101-105 may then apply the update in a similarmanner as described above for the IoT hub and report back the results ofthe update to the IoT hub 110. If the update is successful, then the IoThub 110 may delete the update from its memory and record the latestversion of code installed on each IoT device (e.g., so that it maycontinue to check for new updates for each IoT device).

In one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 is powered via A/C power. Inparticular, the IoT hub 110 may include a power unit 390 with atransformer for transforming A/C voltage supplied via an A/C power cordto a lower DC voltage.

FIG. 4A illustrates one embodiment of the invention for performinguniversal remote control operations using the IoT system. In particular,in this embodiment, a set of IoT devices 101-103 are equipped withinfrared (IR) and/or radio frequency (RF) blasters 401-403,respectively, for transmitting remote control codes to control variousdifferent types of electronics equipment including airconditioners/heaters 430, lighting systems 431, and audiovisualequipment 432 (to name just a few). In the embodiment shown in FIG. 4A,the IoT devices 101-103 are also equipped with sensors 404-406,respectively, for detecting the operation of the devices which theycontrol, as described below.

For example, sensor 404 in IoT device 101 may be a temperature and/orhumidity sensor for sensing the current temperature/humidity andresponsively controlling the air conditioner/heater 430 based on acurrent desired temperature. In this embodiment, the airconditioner/heater 430 is one which is designed to be controlled via aremote control device (typically a remote control which itself has atemperature sensor embedded therein). In one embodiment, the userprovides the desired temperature to the IoT hub 110 via an app orbrowser installed on a user device 135. Control logic 412 executed onthe IoT hub 110 receives the current temperature/humidity data from thesensor 404 and responsively transmits commands to the IoT device 101 tocontrol the IR/RF blaster 401 in accordance with the desiredtemperature/humidity. For example, if the temperature is below thedesired temperature, then the control logic 412 may transmit a commandto the air conditioner/heater via the IR/RF blaster 401 to increase thetemperature (e.g., either by turning off the air conditioner or turningon the heater). The command may include the necessary remote controlcode stored in a database 413 on the IoT hub 110. Alternatively, or inaddition, the IoT service 421 may implement control logic 421 to controlthe electronics equipment 430-432 based on specified user preferencesand stored control codes 422.

IoT device 102 in the illustrated example is used to control lighting431. In particular, sensor 405 in IoT device 102 may photosensor orphotodetector configured to detect the current brightness of the lightbeing produced by a light fixture 431 (or other lighting apparatus). Theuser may specify a desired lighting level (including an indication of ONor OFF) to the IoT hub 110 via the user device 135. In response, thecontrol logic 412 will transmit commands to the IR/RF blaster 402 tocontrol the current brightness level of the lights 431 (e.g., increasingthe lighting if the current brightness is too low or decreasing thelighting if the current brightness is too high; or simply turning thelights ON or OFF).

IoT device 103 in the illustrated example is configured to controlaudiovisual equipment 432 (e.g., a television, A/V receiver,cable/satellite receiver, AppleTV™, etc). Sensor 406 in IoT device 103may be an audio sensor (e.g., a microphone and associated logic) fordetecting a current ambient volume level and/or a photosensor to detectwhether a television is on or off based on the light generated by thetelevision (e.g., by measuring the light within a specified spectrum).Alternatively, sensor 406 may include a temperature sensor connected tothe audiovisual equipment to detect whether the audio equipment is on oroff based on the detected temperature. Once again, in response to userinput via the user device 135, the control logic 412 may transmitcommands to the audiovisual equipment via the IR blaster 403 of the IoTdevice 103.

It should be noted that the foregoing are merely illustrative examplesof one embodiment of the invention. The underlying principles of theinvention are not limited to any particular type of sensors or equipmentto be controlled by IoT devices.

In an embodiment in which the IoT devices 101-103 are coupled to the IoThub 110 via a Bluetooth LE connection, the sensor data and commands aresent over the Bluetooth LE channel. However, the underlying principlesof the invention are not limited to Bluetooth LE or any othercommunication standard.

In one embodiment, the control codes required to control each of thepieces of electronics equipment are stored in a database 413 on the IoThub 110 and/or a database 422 on the IoT service 120. As illustrated inFIG. 4B, the control codes may be provided to the IoT hub 110 from amaster database of control codes 422 for different pieces of equipmentmaintained on the IoT service 120. The end user may specify the types ofelectronic (or other) equipment to be controlled via the app or browserexecuted on the user device 135 and, in response, a remote control codelearning module 491 on the IoT hub may retrieve the required IR/RF codesfrom the remote control code database 492 on the IoT service 120 (e.g.,identifying each piece of electronic equipment with a unique ID).

In addition, in one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 is equipped with anIR/RF interface 490 to allow the remote control code learning module 491to “learn” new remote control codes directly from the original remotecontrol 495 provided with the electronic equipment. For example, ifcontrol codes for the original remote control provided with the airconditioner 430 is not included in the remote control database, the usermay interact with the IoT hub 110 via the app/browser on the user device135 to teach the IoT hub 110 the various control codes generated by theoriginal remote control (e.g., increase temperature, decreasetemperature, etc). Once the remote control codes are learned they may bestored in the control code database 413 on the IoT hub 110 and/or sentback to the IoT service 120 to be included in the central remote controlcode database 492 (and subsequently used by other users with the sameair conditioner unit 430).

In one embodiment, each of the IoT devices 101-103 have an extremelysmall form factor and may be affixed on or near their respectiveelectronics equipment 430-432 using double-sided tape, a small nail, amagnetic attachment, etc. For control of a piece of equipment such asthe air conditioner 430, it would be desirable to place the IoT device101 sufficiently far away so that the sensor 404 can accurately measurethe ambient temperature in the home (e.g., placing the IoT devicedirectly on the air conditioner would result in a temperaturemeasurement which would be too low when the air conditioner was runningor too high when the heater was running). In contrast, the IoT device102 used for controlling lighting may be placed on or near the lightingfixture 431 for the sensor 405 to detect the current lighting level.

In addition to providing general control functions as described, oneembodiment of the IoT hub 110 and/or IoT service 120 transmitsnotifications to the end user related to the current status of eachpiece of electronics equipment. The notifications, which may be textmessages and/or app-specific notifications, may then be displayed on thedisplay of the user's mobile device 135. For example, if the user's airconditioner has been on for an extended period of time but thetemperature has not changed, the IoT hub 110 and/or IoT service 120 maysend the user a notification that the air conditioner is not functioningproperly. If the user is not home (which may be detected via motionsensors or based on the user's current detected location), and thesensors 406 indicate that audiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405indicate that the lights are on, then a notification may be sent to theuser, asking if the user would like to turn off the audiovisualequipment 432 and/or lights 431. The same type of notification may besent for any equipment type.

Once the user receives a notification, he/she may remotely control theelectronics equipment 430-432 via the app or browser on the user device135. In one embodiment, the user device 135 is a touchscreen device andthe app or browser displays an image of a remote control withuser-selectable buttons for controlling the equipment 430-432. Uponreceiving a notification, the user may open the graphical remote controland turn off or adjust the various different pieces of equipment. Ifconnected via the IoT service 120, the user's selections may beforwarded from the IoT service 120 to the IoT hub 110 which will thencontrol the equipment via the control logic 412. Alternatively, the userinput may be sent directly to the IoT hub 110 from the user device 135.

In one embodiment, the user may program the control logic 412 on the IoThub 110 to perform various automatic control functions with respect tothe electronics equipment 430-432. In addition to maintaining a desiredtemperature, brightness level, and volume level as described above, thecontrol logic 412 may automatically turn off the electronics equipmentif certain conditions are detected. For example, if the control logic412 detects that the user is not home and that the air conditioner isnot functioning, it may automatically turn off the air conditioner.Similarly, if the user is not home, and the sensors 406 indicate thataudiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405 indicate that the lightsare on, then the control logic 412 may automatically transmit commandsvia the IR/RF blasters 403 and 402, to turn off the audiovisualequipment and lights, respectively.

FIG. 5 illustrates additional embodiments of IoT devices 104-105equipped with sensors 503-504 for monitoring electronic equipment530-531. In particular, the IoT device 104 of this embodiment includes atemperature sensor 503 which may be placed on or near a stove 530 todetect when the stove has been left on. In one embodiment, the IoTdevice 104 transmits the current temperature measured by the temperaturesensor 503 to the IoT hub 110 and/or the IoT service 120. If the stoveis detected to be on for more than a threshold time period (e.g., basedon the measured temperature), then control logic 512 may transmit anotification to the end user's device 135 informing the user that thestove 530 is on. In addition, in one embodiment, the IoT device 104 mayinclude a control module 501 to turn off the stove, either in responseto receiving an instruction from the user or automatically (if thecontrol logic 512 is programmed to do so by the user). In oneembodiment, the control logic 501 comprises a switch to cut offelectricity or gas to the stove 530. However, in other embodiments, thecontrol logic 501 may be integrated within the stove itself.

FIG. 5 also illustrates an IoT device 105 with a motion sensor 504 fordetecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as awasher and/or dryer. Another sensor that may be used is an audio sensor(e.g., microphone and logic) for detecting an ambient volume level. Aswith the other embodiments described above, this embodiment may transmitnotifications to the end user if certain specified conditions are met(e.g., if motion is detected for an extended period of time, indicatingthat the washer/dryer are not turning off). Although not shown in FIG.5, IoT device 105 may also be equipped with a control module to turn offthe washer/dryer 531 (e.g., by switching off electric/gas),automatically, and/or in response to user input.

In one embodiment, a first IoT device with control logic and a switchmay be configured to turn off all power in the user's home and a secondIoT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn offall gas in the user's home. IoT devices with sensors may then bepositioned on or near electronic or gas-powered equipment in the user'shome. If the user is notified that a particular piece of equipment hasbeen left on (e.g., the stove 530), the user may then send a command toturn off all electricity or gas in the home to prevent damage.Alternatively, the control logic 512 in the IoT hub 110 and/or the IoTservice 120 may be configured to automatically turn off electricity orgas in such situations.

In one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 and IoT service 120 communicate atperiodic intervals. If the IoT service 120 detects that the connectionto the IoT hub 110 has been lost (e.g., by failing to receive a requestor response from the IoT hub for a specified duration), it willcommunicate this information to the end user's device 135 (e.g., bysending a text message or app-specific notification).

Embodiments for Improved Security

In one embodiment, the low power microcontroller 200 of each IoT device101 and the low power logic/microcontroller 301 of the IoT hub 110include a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by theembodiments described below (see, e.g., FIGS. 6-11 and associated text).Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module(SIM) as discussed below.

FIG. 6 illustrates a high level architecture which uses public keyinfrastructure (PKI) techniques and/or symmetric key exchange/encryptiontechniques to encrypt communications between the IoT Service 120, theIoT hub 110 and the IoT devices 101-102.

Embodiments which use public/private key pairs will first be described,followed by embodiments which use symmetric key exchange/encryptiontechniques. In particular, in an embodiment which uses PKI, a uniquepublic/private key pair is associated with each IoT device 101-102, eachIoT hub 110 and the IoT service 120. In one embodiment, when a new IoThub 110 is set up, its public key is provided to the IoT service 120 andwhen a new IoT device 101 is set up, it's public key is provided to boththe IoT hub 110 and the IoT service 120. Various techniques for securelyexchanging the public keys between devices are described below. In oneembodiment, all public keys are signed by a master key known to all ofthe receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that anyreceiving device can verify the validity of the public keys byvalidating the signatures. Thus, these certificates would be exchangedrather than merely exchanging the raw public keys.

As illustrated, in one embodiment, each IoT device 101, 102 includes asecure key storage 601, 603, respectively, for security storing eachdevice's private key. Security logic 602, 1304 then utilizes thesecurely stored private keys to perform the encryption/decryptionoperations described herein. Similarly, the IoT hub 110 includes asecure storage 611 for storing the IoT hub private key and the publickeys of the IoT devices 101-102 and the IoT service 120; as well assecurity logic 612 for using the keys to perform encryption/decryptionoperations. Finally, the IoT service 120 may include a secure storage621 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of variousIoT devices and IoT hubs, and a security logic 613 for using the keys toencrypt/decrypt communication with IoT hubs and devices. In oneembodiment, when the IoT hub 110 receives a public key certificate froman IoT device it can verify it (e.g., by validating the signature usingthe master key as described above), and then extract the public key fromwithin it and store that public key in it's secure key store 611.

By way of example, in one embodiment, when the IoT service 120 needs totransmit a command or data to an IoT device 101 (e.g., a command tounlock a door, a request to read a sensor, data to beprocessed/displayed by the IoT device, etc) the security logic 613encrypts the data/command using the public key of the IoT device 101 togenerate an encrypted IoT device packet. In one embodiment, it thenencrypts the IoT device packet using the public key of the IoT hub 110to generate an IoT hub packet and transmits the IoT hub packet to theIoT hub 110. In one embodiment, the service 120 signs the encryptedmessage with it's private key or the master key mentioned above so thatthe device 101 can verify it is receiving an unaltered message from atrusted source. The device 101 may then validate the signature using thepublic key corresponding to the private key and/or the master key. Asmentioned above, symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques may beused instead of public/private key encryption. In these embodiments,rather than privately storing one key and providing a correspondingpublic key to other devices, the devices may each be provided with acopy of the same symmetric key to be used for encryption and to validatesignatures. One example of a symmetric key algorithm is the AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), although the underlying principles of theinvention are not limited to any type of specific symmetric keys.

Using a symmetric key implementation, each device 101 enters into asecure key exchange protocol to exchange a symmetric key with the IoThub 110. A secure key provisioning protocol such as the DynamicSymmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) may be used to exchange thekeys over a secure communication channel (see, e.g., Request forComments (RFC) 6063). However, the underlying principles of theinvention are not limited to any particular key provisioning protocol.

Once the symmetric keys have been exchanged, they may be used by eachdevice 101 and the IoT hub 110 to encrypt communications. Similarly, theIoT hub 110 and IoT service 120 may perform a secure symmetric keyexchange and then use the exchanged symmetric keys to encryptcommunications. In one embodiment a new symmetric key is exchangedperiodically between the devices 101 and the hub 110 and between the hub110 and the IoT service 120. In one embodiment, a new symmetric key isexchanged with each new communication session between the devices 101,the hub 110, and the service 120 (e.g., a new key is generated andsecurely exchanged for each communication session). In one embodiment,if the security module 612 in the IoT hub is trusted, the service 120could negotiate a session key with the hub security module 1312 and thenthe security module 612 would negotiate a session key with each device120. Messages from the service 120 would then be decrypted and verifiedin the hub security module 612 before being re-encrypted fortransmission to the device 101.

In one embodiment, to prevent a compromise on the hub security module612 a one-time (permanent) installation key may be negotiated betweenthe device 101 and service 120 at installation time. When sending amessage to a device 101 the service 120 could first encrypt/MAC withthis device installation key, then encrypt/MAC that with the hub'ssession key. The hub 110 would then verify and extract the encrypteddevice blob and send that to the device.

In one embodiment of the invention, a counter mechanism is implementedto prevent replay attacks. For example, each successive communicationfrom the device 101 to the hub 110 (or vice versa) may be assigned acontinually increasing counter value. Both the hub 110 and device 101will track this value and verify that the value is correct in eachsuccessive communication between the devices. The same techniques may beimplemented between the hub 110 and the service 120. Using a counter inthis manner would make it more difficult to spoof the communicationbetween each of the devices (because the counter value would beincorrect). However, even without this a shared installation key betweenthe service and device would prevent network (hub) wide attacks to alldevices.

In one embodiment, when using public/private key encryption, the IoT hub110 uses its private key to decrypt the IoT hub packet and generate theencrypted IoT device packet, which it transmits to the associated IoTdevice 101. The IoT device 101 then uses its private key to decrypt theIoT device packet to generate the command/data originated from the IoTservice 120. It may then process the data and/or execute the command.Using symmetric encryption, each device would encrypt and decrypt withthe shared symmetric key. If either case, each transmitting device mayalso sign the message with it's private key so that the receiving devicecan verify it's authenticity.

A different set of keys may be used to encrypt communication from theIoT device 101 to the IoT hub 110 and to the IoT service 120. Forexample, using a public/private key arrangement, in one embodiment, thesecurity logic 602 on the IoT device 101 uses the public key of the IoThub 110 to encrypt data packets sent to the IoT hub 110. The securitylogic 612 on the IoT hub 110 may then decrypt the data packets using theIoT hub's private key. Similarly, the security logic 602 on the IoTdevice 101 and/or the security logic 612 on the IoT hub 110 may encryptdata packets sent to the IoT service 120 using the public key of the IoTservice 120 (which may then be decrypted by the security logic 613 onthe IoT service 120 using the service's private key). Using symmetrickeys, the device 101 and hub 110 may share a symmetric key while the huband service 120 may share a different symmetric key.

While certain specific details are set forth above in the descriptionabove, it should be noted that the underlying principles of theinvention may be implemented using various different encryptiontechniques. For example, while some embodiments discussed above useasymmetric public/private key pairs, an alternate embodiment may usesymmetric keys securely exchanged between the various IoT devices101-102, IoT hubs 110, and the IoT service 120. Moreover, in someembodiments, the data/command itself is not encrypted, but a key is usedto generate a signature over the data/command (or other data structure).The recipient may then use its key to validate the signature.

As illustrated in FIG. 7, in one embodiment, the secure key storage oneach IoT device 101 is implemented using a programmable subscriberidentity module (SIM) 701. In this embodiment, the IoT device 101 mayinitially be provided to the end user with an un-programmed SIM card 701seated within a SIM interface 700 on the IoT device 101. In order toprogram the SIM with a set of one or more encryption keys, the usertakes the programmable SIM card 701 out of the SIM interface 500 andinserts it into a SIM programming interface 702 on the IoT hub 110.Programming logic 725 on the IoT hub then securely programs the SIM card701 to register/pair the IoT device 101 with the IoT hub 110 and IoTservice 120. In one embodiment, a public/private key pair may berandomly generated by the programming logic 725 and the public key ofthe pair may then be stored in the IoT hub's secure storage device 411while the private key may be stored within the programmable SIM 701. Inaddition, the programming logic 525 may store the public keys of the IoThub 110, the IoT service 120, and/or any other IoT devices 101 on theSIM card 601 (to be used by the security logic 1302 on the IoT device101 to encrypt outgoing data). Once the SIM 701 is programmed, the newIoT device 101 may be provisioned with the IoT Service 120 using the SIMas a secure identifier (e.g., using existing techniques for registeringa device using a SIM). Following provisioning, both the IoT hub 110 andthe IoT service 120 will securely store a copy of the IoT device'spublic key to be used when encrypting communication with the IoT device101.

The techniques described above with respect to FIG. 7 provide enormousflexibility when providing new IoT devices to end users. Rather thanrequiring a user to directly register each SIM with a particular serviceprovider upon sale/purchase (as is currently done), the SIM may beprogrammed directly by the end user via the IoT hub 110 and the resultsof the programming may be securely communicated to the IoT service 120.Consequently, new IoT devices 101 may be sold to end users from onlineor local retailers and later securely provisioned with the IoT service120.

While the registration and encryption techniques are described abovewithin the specific context of a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module), theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to a “SIM”device. Rather, the underlying principles of the invention may beimplemented using any type of device having secure storage for storing aset of encryption keys. Moreover, while the embodiments above include aremovable SIM device, in one embodiment, the SIM device is not removablebut the IoT device itself may be inserted within the programminginterface 702 of the IoT hub 110.

In one embodiment, rather than requiring the user to program the SIM (orother device), the SIM is pre-programmed into the IoT device 101, priorto distribution to the end user. In this embodiment, when the user setsup the IoT device 101, various techniques described herein may be usedto securely exchange encryption keys between the IoT hub 110/IoT service120 and the new IoT device 101.

For example, as illustrated in FIG. 8A each IoT device 101 or SIM 401may be packaged with a barcode or QR code 701 uniquely identifying theIoT device 101 and/or SIM 701. In one embodiment, the barcode or QR code801 comprises an encoded representation of the public key for the IoTdevice 101 or SIM 1001. Alternatively, the barcode or QR code 801 may beused by the IoT hub 110 and/or IoT service 120 to identify or generatethe public key (e.g., used as a pointer to the public key which isalready stored in secure storage). The barcode or QR code 601 may beprinted on a separate card (as shown in FIG. 8A) or may be printeddirectly on the IoT device itself. Regardless of where the barcode isprinted, in one embodiment, the IoT hub 110 is equipped with a barcodereader 206 for reading the barcode and providing the resulting data tothe security logic 1012 on the IoT hub 110 and/or the security logic1013 on the IoT service 120. The security logic 1012 on the IoT hub 110may then store the public key for the IoT device within its secure keystorage 1011 and the security logic 1013 on the IoT service 120 maystore the public key within its secure storage 1021 (to be used forsubsequent encrypted communication).

In one embodiment, the data contained in the barcode or QR code 801 mayalso be captured via a user device 135 (e.g., such as an iPhone orAndroid device) with an installed IoT app or browser-based appletdesigned by the IoT service provider. Once captured, the barcode datamay be securely communicated to the IoT service 120 over a secureconnection (e.g., such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection). Thebarcode data may also be provided from the client device 135 to the IoThub 110 over a secure local connection (e.g., over a local WiFi orBluetooth LE connection).

The security logic 1002 on the IoT device 101 and the security logic1012 on the IoT hub 110 may be implemented using hardware, software,firmware or any combination thereof. For example, in one embodiment, thesecurity logic 1002, 1012 is implemented within the chips used forestablishing the local communication channel 130 between the IoT device101 and the IoT hub 110 (e.g., the Bluetooth LE chip if the localchannel 130 is Bluetooth LE). Regardless of the specific location of thesecurity logic 1002, 1012, in one embodiment, the security logic 1002,1012 is designed to establish a secure execution environment forexecuting certain types of program code. This may be implemented, forexample, by using TrustZone technology (available on some ARMprocessors) and/or Trusted Execution Technology (designed by Intel). Ofcourse, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited toany particular type of secure execution technology.

In one embodiment, the barcode or QR code 701 may be used to pair eachIoT device 101 with the IoT hub 110. For example, rather than using thestandard wireless pairing process currently used to pair Bluetooth LEdevices, a pairing code embedded within the barcode or QR code 701 maybe provided to the IoT hub 110 to pair the IoT hub with thecorresponding IoT device.

FIG. 8B illustrates one embodiment in which the barcode reader 206 onthe IoT hub 110 captures the barcode/QR code 801 associated with the IoTdevice 101. As mentioned, the barcode/QR code 801 may be printeddirectly on the IoT device 101 or may be printed on a separate cardprovided with the IoT device 101. In either case, the barcode reader 206reads the pairing code from the barcode/QR code 801 and provides thepairing code to the local communication module 880. In one embodiment,the local communication module 880 is a Bluetooth LE chip and associatedsoftware, although the underlying principles of the invention are notlimited to any particular protocol standard. Once the pairing code isreceived, it is stored in a secure storage containing pairing data 885and the IoT device 101 and IoT hub 110 are automatically paired. Eachtime the IoT hub is paired with a new IoT device in this manner, thepairing data for that pairing is stored within the secure storage 685.In one embodiment, once the local communication module 880 of the IoThub 110 receives the pairing code, it may use the code as a key toencrypt communications over the local wireless channel with the IoTdevice 101.

Similarly, on the IoT device 101 side, the local communication module890 stores pairing data within a local secure storage device 895indicating the pairing with the IoT hub. The pairing data 895 mayinclude the pre-programmed pairing code identified in the barcode/QRcode 801. The pairing data 895 may also include pairing data receivedfrom the local communication module 880 on the IoT hub 110 required forestablishing a secure local communication channel (e.g., an additionalkey to encrypt communication with the IoT hub 110).

Thus, the barcode/QR code 801 may be used to perform local pairing in afar more secure manner than current wireless pairing protocols becausethe pairing code is not transmitted over the air. In addition, in oneembodiment, the same barcode/QR code 801 used for pairing may be used toidentify encryption keys to build a secure connection from the IoTdevice 101 to the IoT hub 110 and from the IoT hub 110 to the IoTservice 120.

A method for programming a SIM card in accordance with one embodiment ofthe invention is illustrated in FIG. 9. The method may be implementedwithin the system architecture described above, but is not limited toany particular system architecture.

At 901, a user receives a new IoT device with a blank SIM card and, at802, the user inserts the blank SIM card into an IoT hub. At 903, theuser programs the blank SIM card with a set of one or more encryptionkeys. For example, as mentioned above, in one embodiment, the IoT hubmay randomly generate a public/private key pair and store the privatekey on the SIM card and the public key in its local secure storage. Inaddition, at 904, at least the public key is transmitted to the IoTservice so that it may be used to identify the IoT device and establishencrypted communication with the IoT device. As mentioned above, in oneembodiment, a programmable device other than a “SIM” card may be used toperform the same functions as the SIM card in the method shown in FIG.9.

A method for integrating a new IoT device into a network is illustratedin FIG. 10. The method may be implemented within the system architecturedescribed above, but is not limited to any particular systemarchitecture.

At 1001, a user receives a new IoT device to which an encryption key hasbeen pre-assigned. At 1002, the key is securely provided to the IoT hub.As mentioned above, in one embodiment, this involves reading a barcodeassociated with the IoT device to identify the public key of apublic/private key pair assigned to the device. The barcode may be readdirectly by the IoT hub or captured via a mobile device via an app orbowser. In an alternate embodiment, a secure communication channel suchas a Bluetooth LE channel, a near field communication (NFC) channel or asecure WiFi channel may be established between the IoT device and theIoT hub to exchange the key. Regardless of how the key is transmitted,once received, it is stored in the secure keystore of the IoT hubdevice. As mentioned above, various secure execution technologies may beused on the IoT hub to store and protect the key such as SecureEnclaves, Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), and/or Trustzone. Inaddition, at 1003, the key is securely transmitted to the IoT servicewhich stores the key in its own secure keystore. It may then use the keyto encrypt communication with the IoT device. One again, the exchangemay be implemented using a certificate/signed key. Within the hub 110 itis particularly important to prevent modification/addition/ removal ofthe stored keys.

A method for securely communicating commands/data to an IoT device usingpublic/private keys is illustrated in FIG. 11. The method may beimplemented within the system architecture described above, but is notlimited to any particular system architecture.

At 1101, the IoT service encrypts the data/commands using the IoT devicepublic key to create an IoT device packet. It then encrypts the IoTdevice packet using IoT hub's public key to create the IoT hub packet(e.g., creating an IoT hub wrapper around the IoT device packet). At1102, the IoT service transmits the IoT hub packet to the IoT hub. At1103, the IoT hub decrypts the IoT hub packet using the IoT hub'sprivate key to generate the IoT device packet. At 1104 it then transmitsthe IoT device packet to the IoT device which, at 1105, decrypts the IoTdevice packet using the IoT device private key to generate thedata/commands. At 1106, the IoT device processes the data/commands.

In an embodiment which uses symmetric keys, a symmetric key exchange maybe negotiated between each of the devices (e.g., each device and the huband between the hub and the service). Once the key exchange is complete,each transmitting device encrypts and/or signs each transmission usingthe symmetric key before transmitting data to the receiving device.

Embodiments for Automatic Wireless Network Authentication

In order to connect the IoT hub to a local wireless network such as aWiFi network, the user must provide network credentials such as anetwork security key or password. Other layers of authentication mayalso be required such as a user ID/password combination. In oneembodiment, once the IoT hub successfully connects to the local wirelessnetwork using the network credentials provided by the user, it securelytransmits the network credentials to a secure storage location such asthe IoT service 120. When a user subsequently receives a new IoT device,the IoT device may be configured to transmit a request for networkcredentials to the IoT hub. in response, the IoT hub may forward therequest to the IoT service 120 which may perform a lookup in acredentials database using, for example, the identity of the IoT device,the user, and/or the access point to which connection is needed toidentify the relevant network credentials. If the network credentialscan be identified, they are transmitted back to the IoT device, whichthen uses the network credentials to seamlessly connect to the localwireless network.

FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary system architecture in which acredentials management module 1210 on the IoT hub 1202 implements thecredential processing techniques described herein. As illustrated, theuser may provide network credentials such as a network security key orpassword to the IoT hub 1202 via a user device 135 (which may be amobile smartphone device, wearable data processing device, laptopcomputer, or desktop computer). The user device 135 initially connectsto the IoT hub 1202 through a wired connection or a short range wirelessconnection such as BTLE and the user provides the credentials via an appor browser configured to connect with the IoT hub 1202.

In one embodiment, the network credentials comprise a security key suchas a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) or Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2).In this embodiment, the network credentials may be in the form of apre-shared key (PSK) for WPA-Personal implementations or may rely onmore advanced authentication techniques such as those used byWPA-Enterprise (which may utilize a RADIUS authentication server andvarious forms of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)).

Regardless of the specific authentication/encryption techniques used,once the user has provided the necessary network credentials, the IoThub 1202 uses the credentials to establish a secure wireless connectionto the WiFi access point/router 1200 which then provides connectivity toa cloud service 1220 over the Internet 1222. In one embodiment, thecredentials management module 1210 on the IoT hub 1210 establishes aconnection with a credentials management module 1215 on the cloudservice 1220 (e.g., which may be the IoT service 120 or an external website 130 described above).

In one embodiment, one or more of the key-based s techniques describedabove may be employed to ensure that the connection between thecredentials management module 1210 on the IoT hub 1202 and thecredentials management module 1215 on the cloud service 1220 is secure(e.g., using a symmetric or asymmetric key to encrypt all networktraffic). Once a secure connection has been established, the credentialsmanagement module 1210 on the IoT hub 1202 transmits a copy of thenetwork credentials to the credentials management module 1215 on thecloud service, which stores a copy of the credentials in a securecredentials database 1230. The credentials database 1230 may includedata uniquely identifying the IoT hub 1202, data uniquely identifyingthe user account associated with the IoT hub 1202, and/or data uniquelyidentifying the WiFi access point/router 1200 (to ensure that thenetwork credentials are associated with the correct user and WiFi accesspoint/router).

As illustrated in FIG. 13, after the network credentials have beenstored in the credentials database 1230, when the user purchases a newIoT device 1300, the IoT device will enable its local wireless interface(e.g., BTLE) and search for any enabled devices within coverage (e.g.,the IoT Hub 1202, other IoT devices, or the user's mobile device). Inthe specific embodiment shown in FIG. 13, the IoT device 1300 hasdetected and connected to an IoT hub 1202. In one embodiment, once theconnection is established, a network registration module 1310 transmitsa network credentials request to the credentials management module 1210on the IoT hub 1202. The credentials request may include dataidentifying the WiFI access point/router 1200 to which the IoT device1300 would like to connect (e.g., the SSID, MAC address or other datauniquely identifying the WiFi access point/router 1200) as well as datauniquely identifying the IoT device 1300.

The credentials management module 1210 then securely transmits acredentials management request to the credentials management module 1215on the cloud service 1220, which uses the data uniquely identifying theuser, the IoT device 1300, and/or the WiFi access point/router 1200 toperform a lookup in the credentials database 1230. Once again, any ofthe key-based security techniques may be used to ensure the connectionbetween the IoT hub and cloud service is secure. If credentials arelocated based on the data provided in the request, the credentialsmanagement module 1215 securely transmits the network credentials backto the credentials management module 1210 on the IoT hub 1202, whichthen provides the network credentials to the network registration module1310 of the IoT device 1300. The IoT device 1300 then uses the networkcredentials to automatically establish a secure connection to the WiFiaccess point/router 1200. The end result is that the user is notrequired to manually configure the new IoT device 1300 to connect withthe WiFi access point/router 1200. Rather, because the networkcredentials have already been associated with the user's account on thecloud service 1220 they may be automatically provided to the IoT device1300 which will then seamlessly connect to the network.

As mentioned above, while FIG. 13 illustrates the IoT device 1300connecting through an IoT hub 1202, the IoT device 1300 may connectthrough another IoT device if the lot hub 1202 is not within range. Theother IoT device (which is connected to the IoT hub) may then couple thenew IoT device to the credentials management module 1210 on the IoT hub1202. Similarly, if both the IoT hub and another IoT are unavailable(e.g., out of range), the IoT device 1300 may be configured to connectwith the user's mobile device 135, which may include a browser/app toconnect with the credentials management module 1215 on the cloud service(either directly or through the IoT hub 1202).

In one embodiment, the network registration module 1310 on the IoT hub1300 is configured to search first for an IoT hub 1202, then for anotherIoT device, and then for a user mobile device. It will then connect tothe first one of the above devices to offer a connection. The aboveconnections may be formed using any type of local communication protocolincluding, but not limited to BTLE.

In one embodiment, the network credentials may be stored locally in asecure storage device accessible by the IoT hub 1202 or contained withinthe IoT hub 1202 (in addition to or in lieu of storing the networkcredentials remotely on the cloud service 1220). Consequently, in thisembodiment, the network credentials may be provided without the need fora remote query to the cloud service 1220.

The term “cloud service” and “IoT cloud service” may refer to anyservice on the Internet capable of storing and providing networkcredentials for IoT devices as described herein (e.g., such as the IoTservice and external services referenced above). In one embodiment, thecloud service 1220 is owned and operated by the same entity thatprovides the IoT hub and IoT devices to the end user. In anotherembodiment, at least some of the IoT devices may be designed and sold byOEMs which coordinate with the cloud service (e.g., via an agreed-uponbusiness arrangement) to ensure that the techniques described herein maybe implemented using the cloud service 1220.

A method for collecting and storing network credentials in accordancewith one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in FIG. 14. Themethod may be implemented within the context of the system architecturesdescribed above, but is not limited to any particular architecture.

At 1401, the user provides network credentials to the IoT hub. Thecredentials may be provided, for example, through a network setup wizardexecuted within a browser or app installed on the user's data processingdevice, which may connect to the IoT hub through a wired or localwireless connection (e.g., BTLE). Once the network credentials areprovided, at 1402 the IoT hub establishes a secure connection to the IoTcloud service over the Internet and, at 1403, securely transmits thenetwork credentials to the IoT cloud service. At 1404, the IoT CloudService stores the network credentials in its database, associating thecredentials with the user's account on the IoT cloud service and/or withthe particular WiFi access point/router for which the networkcredentials are being used.

FIG. 15 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of theinvention for seamlessly updating a new IoT device using stored networkcredentials. The method may be implemented within the context of thesystem architectures described above, but is not limited to anyparticular architecture.

At 1501, the user receives a new IoT device. The IoT device may havebeen ordered from the IoT cloud service and/or from an OEM who has arelationship with the IoT cloud service. In either case, the new IoTdevice is associated with the an account of the user who received thenew IoT device.

At 1502, when the new IoT device is powered on, it initially searchesfor a local IoT hub. As mentioned, the search may be performed using alocal wireless protocol such as BTLE. If it cannot locate an IoT hub(e.g., because it is out of range), it may then search for another IoTdevice and/or a mobile device of the end user (with an app or browserinstalled thereon to enable a connection to the IoT cloud service).

At 1503 a determination is made as to whether the new IoT device hasdetected the presence of an IoT hub, another IoT device, or the user'smobile device. If an IoT hub is detected, then at 1504, the new IoTdevice connects to the IoT hub and, at 1505, the IoT hub retrieves thenetwork credentials from the cloud service on behalf of the new IoTdevice and provides the credentials to the new IoT device. At 1510, thenew IoT device uses the network credentials to register with thewireless network.

If the new IoT device detected another IoT device, then at 1506 itconnects to the other IoT device and, at 1507, the IoT device retrievesthe network credentials from the IoT cloud service and provides them tothe new IoT device. In one embodiment, this may be accomplished throughthe IoT hub (i.e., if the other device is connected to the IoT hub).Once again, at 1510, the new IoT device uses the network credentials toregister with the wireless network.

If the new IoT device detects the user's mobile device, then at 1508, itconnects to the mobile device. In one embodiment, the connection ismanaged by an app such as a connection wizard or browser-executable codeon the user's mobile device. At 1509, the IoT device retrieves thenetwork credentials from the IoT cloud service and provides them to thenew IoT device. In one embodiment, this may be accomplished through theIoT hub (i.e., if the other device is connected to the IoT hub). At1510, the new IoT device uses the network credentials to register withthe wireless network.

As mentioned, in one embodiment, the network registration module 1310executed on the new mobile device utilizes a connection priority schemeto determine the order of devices that it should search for when poweredon. In one embodiment, it will initially search for an IoT hub and, ifone cannot be found, will search for other IoT devices. If none oravailable, it will then attempt to connect to the user's mobile device.Alternatively, the new IoT device may simply connect to the first deviceit locates and/or may connect to the device for which it sees thehighest signal strength (i.e., RSSI value). Various other connectiontechniques may be programmed into the network registration module 1310while still complying with the underlying principles of the invention.

Apparatus and Method for Establishing Secure Communication Channels inan Internet of Things (IoT) System

In one embodiment of the invention, encryption and decryption of data isperformed between the IoT service 120 and each IoT device 101,regardless of the intermediate devices used to support the communicationchannel (e.g., such as the user's mobile device 611 and/or the IoT hub110). One embodiment which communicates via an IoT hub 110 isillustrated in FIG. 16A and another embodiment which does not require anIoT hub is illustrated in FIG. 16B.

Turning first to FIG. 16A, the IoT service 120 includes an encryptionengine 1660 which manages a set of “service session keys” 1650 and eachIoT device 101 includes an encryption engine 1661 which manages a set of“device session keys” 1651 for encrypting/decrypting communicationbetween the IoT device 101 and IoT service 120. The encryption enginesmay rely on different hardware modules when performing thesecurity/encryption techniques described herein including a hardwaresecurity module 1630-1631 for (among other things) generating a sessionpublic/private key pair and preventing access to the private session keyof the pair and a key stream generation module 1640-1641 for generatinga key stream using a derived secret. In one embodiment, the servicesession keys 1650 and the device session keys 1651 comprise relatedpublic/private key pairs. For example, in one embodiment, the devicesession keys 1651 on the IoT device 101 include a public key of the IoTservice 120 and a private key of the IoT device 101. As discussed indetail below, in one embodiment, to establish a secure communicationsession, the public/private session key pairs, 1650 and 1651, are usedby each encryption engine, 1660 and 1661, respectively, to generate thesame secret which is then used by the SKGMs 1640-1641 to generate a keystream to encrypt and decrypt communication between the IoT service 120and the IoT device 101. Additional details associated with generationand use of the secret in accordance with one embodiment of the inventionare provided below.

In FIG. 16A, once the secret has been generated using the keys1650-1651, the client will always send messages to the IoT device 101through the IoT service 120, as indicated by Clear transaction 1611.“Clear” as used herein is meant to indicate that the underlying messageis not encrypted using the encryption techniques described herein.However, as illustrated, in one embodiment, a secure sockets layer (SSL)channel or other secure channel (e.g., an Internet Protocol Security(IPSEC) channel) is established between the client device 611 and IoTservice 120 to protect the communication. The encryption engine 1660 onthe IoT service 120 then encrypts the message using the generated secretand transmits the encrypted message to the IoT hub 110 at 1602. Ratherthan using the secret to encrypt the message directly, in oneembodiment, the secret and a counter value are used to generate a keystream, which is used to encrypt each message packet. Details of thisembodiment are described below with respect to FIG. 17.

As illustrated, an SSL connection or other secure channel may beestablished between the IoT service 120 and the IoT hub 110. The IoT hub110 (which does not have the ability to decrypt the message in oneembodiment) transmits the encrypted message to the IoT device at 1603(e.g., over a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel). Theencryption engine 1661 on the IoT device 101 may then decrypt themessage using the secret and process the message contents. In anembodiment which uses the secret to generate a key stream, theencryption engine 1661 may generate the key stream using the secret anda counter value and then use the key stream for decryption of themessage packet.

The message itself may comprise any form of communication between theIoT service 120 and IoT device 101. For example, the message maycomprise a command packet instructing the IoT device 101 to perform aparticular function such as taking a measurement and reporting theresult back to the client device 611 or may include configuration datato configure the operation of the IoT device 101.

If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661 on the IoT device101 uses the secret or a derived key stream to encrypt the response andtransmits the encrypted response to the IoT hub 110 at 1604, whichforwards the response to the IoT service 120 at 1605. The encryptionengine 1660 on the IoT service 120 then decrypts the response using thesecret or a derived key stream and transmits the decrypted response tothe client device 611 at 1606 (e.g., over the SSL or other securecommunication channel).

FIG. 16B illustrates an embodiment which does not require an IoT hub.Rather, in this embodiment, communication between the IoT device 101 andIoT service 120 occurs through the client device 611 (e.g., as in theembodiments described above with respect to FIGS. 6-9B). In thisembodiment, to transmit a message to the IoT device 101 the clientdevice 611 transmits an unencrypted version of the message to the IoTservice 120 at 1611. The encryption engine 1660 encrypts the messageusing the secret or the derived key stream and transmits the encryptedmessage back to the client device 611 at 1612. The client device 611then forwards the encrypted message to the IoT device 101 at 1613, andthe encryption engine 1661 decrypts the message using the secret or thederived key stream. The IoT device 101 may then process the message asdescribed herein. If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661encrypts the response using the secret and transmits the encryptedresponse to the client device 611 at 1614, which forwards the encryptedresponse to the IoT service 120 at 1615. The encryption engine 1660 thendecrypts the response and transmits the decrypted response to the clientdevice 611 at 1616.

FIG. 17 illustrates a key exchange and key stream generation which mayinitially be performed between the IoT service 120 and the IoT device101. In one embodiment, this key exchange may be performed each time theIoT service 120 and IoT device 101 establish a new communicationsession. Alternatively, the key exchange may be performed and theexchanged session keys may be used for a specified period of time (e.g.,a day, a week, etc). While no intermediate devices are shown in FIG. 17for simplicity, communication may occur through the IoT hub 110 and/orthe client device 611.

In one embodiment, the encryption engine 1660 of the IoT service 120sends a command to the HSM 1630 (e.g., which may be such as a CloudHSMoffered by Amazon®) to generate a session public/private key pair. TheHSM 1630 may subsequently prevent access to the private session key ofthe pair. Similarly, the encryption engine on the IoT device 101 maytransmit a command to the HSM 1631 (e.g., such as an Atecc508 HSM fromAtmel Corporation®) which generates a session public/private key pairand prevents access to the session private key of the pair. Of course,the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to anyspecific type of encryption engine or manufacturer.

In one embodiment, the IoT service 120 transmits its session public keygenerated using the HSM 1630 to the IoT device 101 at 1701. The IoTdevice uses its HSM 1631 to generate its own session public/private keypair and, at 1702, transmits its public key of the pair to the IoTservice 120. In one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661 use anElliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, which is an anonymous keyagreement that allows two parties with an elliptic curve public-privatekey pair, to establish a shared secret. In one embodiment, using thesetechniques, at 1703, the encryption engine 1660 of the IoT service 120generates the secret using the IoT device session public key and its ownsession private key. Similarly, at 1704, the encryption engine 1661 ofthe IoT device 101 independently generates the same secret using the IoTservice 120 session public key and its own session private key. Morespecifically, in one embodiment, the encryption engine 1660 on the IoTservice 120 generates the secret according to the formula secret=IoTdevice session pub key * IoT service session private key, where ‘*’means that the IoT device session public key is point-multiplied by theIoT service session private key. The encryption engine 1661 on the IoTdevice 101 generates the secret according to the formula secret=IoTservice session pub key * IoT device session private key, where the IoTservice session public key is point multiplied by the IoT device sessionprivate key. In the end, the IoT service 120 and IoT device 101 haveboth generated the same secret to be used to encrypt communication asdescribed below. In one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661rely on a hardware module such as the KSGMs 1640-1641 respectively toperform the above operations for generating the secret.

Once the secret has been determined, it may be used by the encryptionengines 1660 and 1661 to encrypt and decrypt data directly.Alternatively, in one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661 sendcommands to the KSGMs 1640-1641 to generate a new key stream using thesecret to encrypt/decrypt each data packet (i.e., a new key stream datastructure is generated for each packet). In particular, one embodimentof the key stream generation module 1640-1641 implements aGalois/Counter Mode (GCM) in which a counter value is incremented foreach data packet and is used in combination with the secret to generatethe key stream. Thus, to transmit a data packet to the IoT service 120,the encryption engine 1661 of the IoT device 101 uses the secret and thecurrent counter value to cause the KSGMs 1640-1641 to generate a new keystream and increment the counter value for generating the next keystream. The newly-generated key stream is then used to encrypt the datapacket prior to transmission to the IoT service 120. In one embodiment,the key stream is XORed with the data to generate the encrypted datapacket. In one embodiment, the IoT device 101 transmits the countervalue with the encrypted data packet to the IoT service 120. Theencryption engine 1660 on the IoT service then communicates with theKSGM 1640 which uses the received counter value and the secret togenerate the key stream (which should be the same key stream because thesame secret and counter value are used) and uses the generated keystream to decrypt the data packet.

In one embodiment, data packets transmitted from the IoT service 120 tothe IoT device 101 are encrypted in the same manner. Specifically, acounter is incremented for each data packet and used along with thesecret to generate a new key stream. The key stream is then used toencrypt the data (e.g., performing an XOR of the data and the keystream) and the encrypted data packet is transmitted with the countervalue to the IoT device 101. The encryption engine 1661 on the IoTdevice 101 then communicates with the KSGM 1641 which uses the countervalue and the secret to generate the same key stream which is used todecrypt the data packet. Thus, in this embodiment, the encryptionengines 1660-1661 use their own counter values to generate a key streamto encrypt data and use the counter values received with the encrypteddata packets to generate a key stream to decrypt the data.

In one embodiment, each encryption engine 1660-1661 keeps track of thelast counter value it received from the other and includes sequencinglogic to detect whether a counter value is received out of sequence orif the same counter value is received more than once. If a counter valueis received out of sequence, or if the same counter value is receivedmore than once, this may indicate that a replay attack is beingattempted. In response, the encryption engines 1660-1661 may disconnectfrom the communication channel and/or may generate a security alert.

FIG. 18 illustrates an exemplary encrypted data packet employed in oneembodiment of the invention comprising a 4-byte counter value 1800, avariable-sized encrypted data field 1801, and a 6-byte tag 1802. In oneembodiment, the tag 1802 comprises a checksum value to validate thedecrypted data (once it has been decrypted).

As mentioned, in one embodiment, the session public/private key pairs1650-1651 exchanged between the IoT service 120 and IoT device 101 maybe generated periodically and/or in response to the initiation of eachnew communication session.

One embodiment of the invention implements additional techniques forauthenticating sessions between the IoT service 120 and IoT device 101.In particular, in one embodiment, hierarchy of public/private key pairsis used including a master key pair, a set of factory key pairs, and aset of IoT service key pairs, and a set of IoT device key pairs. In oneembodiment, the master key pair comprises a root of trust for all of theother key pairs and is maintained in a single, highly secure location(e.g., under the control of the organization implementing the IoTsystems described herein). The master private key may be used togenerate signatures over (and thereby authenticate) various other keypairs such as the factory key pairs. The signatures may then be verifiedusing the master public key. In one embodiment, each factory whichmanufactures IoT devices is assigned its own factory key pair which maythen be used to authenticate IoT service keys and IoT device keys. Forexample, in one embodiment, a factory private key is used to generate asignature over IoT service public keys and IoT device public keys. Thesesignature may then be verified using the corresponding factory publickey. Note that these IoT service/device public keys are not the same asthe “session” public/private keys described above with respect to FIGS.16A-B. The session public/private keys described above are temporary(i.e., generated for a service/device session) while the IoTservice/device key pairs are permanent (i.e., generated at the factory).

With the foregoing relationships between master keys, factory keys,service/device keys in mind, one embodiment of the invention performsthe following operations to provide additional layers of authenticationand security between the IoT service 120 and IoT device 101:

A. In one embodiment, the IoT service 120 initially generates a messagecontaining the following:

-   -   1. The IoT service's unique ID:        -   The IoT service's serial number;        -   a Timestamp;        -   The ID of the factory key used to sign this unique ID;        -   a Class of the unique ID (i.e., a service);        -   IoT service's public key        -   The signature over the unique ID.    -   2. The Factory Certificate including:        -   A timestamp        -   The ID of the master key used to sign the certificate        -   The factory public key        -   The signature of the Factory Certificate    -   3. IoT service session public key (as described above with        respect to FIGS. 16A-B)    -   4. IoT service session public key signature (e.g., signed with        the IoT service's private key)

B. In one embodiment, the message is sent to the IoT device on thenegotiation channel (described below). The IoT device parses the messageand:

-   -   1. Verifies the signature of the factory certificate (only if        present in the message payload)    -   2. Verifies the signature of the unique ID using the key        identified by the unique ID    -   3. Verifies the IoT service session public key signature using        the IoT service's public key from the unique ID    -   4. Saves the IoT service's public key as well as the IoT        service's session public key    -   5. Generates the IoT device session key pair

C. The IoT device then generates a message containing the following:

-   -   1. IoT device's unique ID        -   IoT device serial number        -   Timestamp        -   ID of factory key used to sign this unique ID        -   Class of unique ID (i.e., IoT device)        -   IoT device's public key        -   Signature of unique ID    -   2. IoT device's session public key    -   3. Signature of (IoT device session public key +IoT service        session public key) signed with IoT device's key

D. This message is sent back to the IoT service. The IoT service parsesthe message and:

-   -   1. Verifies the signature of the unique ID using the factory        public key    -   2. Verifies the signature of the session public keys using the        IoT device's public key    -   3. Saves the IoT device's session public key

E. The IoT service then generates a message containing a signature of(IoT device session public key +IoT service session public key) signedwith the IoT service's key.

F The IoT device parses the message and:

-   -   1. Verifies the signature of the session public keys using the        IoT service's public key    -   2. Generates the key stream from the IoT device session private        key and the IoT service's session public key    -   3. The IoT device then sends a “messaging available” message.

G. The IoT service then does the following:

-   -   1. Generates the key stream from the IoT service session private        key and the IoT device's session public key    -   2. Creates a new message on the messaging channel which contains        the following:        -   Generates and stores a random 2 byte value        -   Set attribute message with the boomerang attribute Id            (discussed below) and the random value

H. The IoT device receives the message and:

-   -   1. Attempts to decrypt the message    -   2. Emits an Update with the same value on the indicated        attribute Id

I. The IoT service recognizes the message payload contains a boomerangattribute update and:

-   -   1. Sets its paired state to true    -   2. Sends a pairing complete message on the negotiator channel

J. IoT device receives the message and sets his paired state to true

While the above techniques are described with respect to an “IoTservice” and an “IoT device,” the underlying principles of the inventionmay be implemented to establish a secure communication channel betweenany two devices including user client devices, servers, and Internetservices.

The above techniques are highly secure because the private keys arenever shared over the air (in contrast to current Bluetooth pairingtechniques in which a secret is transmitted from one party to theother). An attacker listening to the entire conversation will only havethe public keys, which are insufficient to generate the shared secret.These techniques also prevent a man-in-the-middle attack by exchangingsigned public keys. In addition, because GCM and separate counters areused on each device, any kind of “replay attack” (where a man in themiddle captures the data and sends it again) is prevented. Someembodiments also prevent replay attacks by using asymmetrical counters.

Techniques for Exchanging Data and Commands without Formally PairingDevices

GATT is an acronym for the Generic Attribute Profile, and it defines theway that two Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) devices transfer data back andforth. It makes use of a generic data protocol called the AttributeProtocol (ATT), which is used to store Services, Characteristics andrelated data in a simple lookup table using 16-bit Characteristic IDsfor each entry in the table. Note that while the “characteristics” aresometimes referred to as “attributes.”

On Bluetooth devices, the most commonly used characteristic is thedevices “name” (having characteristic ID 10752 (0x2A00)). For example, aBluetooth device may identify other Bluetooth devices within itsvicinity by reading the “Name” characteristic published by those otherBluetooth devices using GATT. Thus, Bluetooth device have the inherentability to exchange data without formally pairing/bonding the devices(note that “paring” and “bonding” are sometimes used interchangeably;the remainder of this discussion will use the term “pairing”).

One embodiment of the invention takes advantage of this capability tocommunicate with BTLE-enabled IoT devices without formally pairing withthese devices. Pairing with each individual IoT device would extremelyinefficient because of the amount of time required to pair with eachdevice and because only one paired connection may be established at atime.

FIG. 19 illustrates one particular embodiment in which a Bluetooth (BT)device 1910 establishes a network socket abstraction with a BTcommunication module 1901 of an IoT device 101 without formallyestablishing a paired BT connection. The BT device 1910 may be includedin an IoT hub 110 and/or a client device 611 such as shown in FIG. 16A.As illustrated, the BT communication module 1901 maintains a datastructure containing a list of characteristic IDs, names associated withthose characteristic IDs and values for those characteristic IDs. Thevalue for each characteristic may be stored within a 20-byte bufferidentified by the characteristic ID in accordance with the current BTstandard. However, the underlying principles of the invention are notlimited to any particular buffer size.

In the example in FIG. 19, the “Name” characteristic is a BT-definedcharacteristic which is assigned a specific value of “IoT Device 14.”One embodiment of the invention specifies a first set of additionalcharacteristics to be used for negotiating a secure communicationchannel with the BT device 1910 and a second set of additionalcharacteristics to be used for encrypted communication with the BTdevice 1910. In particular, a “negotiation write” characteristic,identified by characteristic ID <65532> in the illustrated example, maybe used to transmit outgoing negotiation messages and the “negotiationread” characteristic, identified by characteristic ID <65533> may beused to receive incoming negotiation messages. The “negotiationmessages” may include messages used by the BT device 1910 and the BTcommunication module 1901 to establish a secure communication channel asdescribed herein. By way of example, in FIG. 17, the IoT device 101 mayreceive the IoT service session public key 1701 via the “negotiationread” characteristic <65533>. The key 1701 may be transmitted from theIoT service 120 to a BTLE-enabled IoT hub 110 or client device 611 whichmay then use GATT to write the key 1701 to the negotiation read valuebuffer identified by characteristic ID <65533>. IoT device applicationlogic 1902 may then read the key 1701 from the value buffer identifiedby characteristic ID <65533> and process it as described above (e.g.,using it to generate a secret and using the secret to generate a keystream, etc).

If the key 1701 is greater than 20 bytes (the maximum buffer size insome current implementations), then it may be written in 20-byteportions. For example, the first 20 bytes may be written by the BTcommunication module 1903 to characteristic ID <65533> and read by theIoT device application logic 1902, which may then write anacknowledgement message to the negotiation write value buffer identifiedby characteristic ID <65532>. Using GATT, the BT communication module1903 may read this acknowledgement from characteristic ID <65532> andresponsively write the next 20 bytes of the key 1701 to the negotiationread value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533>. In thismanner, a network socket abstraction defined by characteristic IDs<65532> and <65533> is established for exchanging negotiation messagesused to establish a secure communication channel.

In one embodiment, once the secure communication channel is established,a second network socket abstraction is established using characteristicID <65534> (for transmitting encrypted data packets from IoT device 101)and characteristic ID <65533> (for receiving encrypted data packets byIoT device). That is, when BT communication module 1903 has an encrypteddata packet to transmit (e.g., such as encrypted message 1603 in FIG.16A), it starts writing the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time,using the message read value buffer identified by characteristic ID<65533>. The IoT device application logic 1902 will then read theencrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, from the read value buffer,sending acknowledgement messages to the BT communication module 1903 asneeded via the write value buffer identified by characteristic ID<65532>.

In one embodiment, the commands of GET, SET, and UPDATE described beloware used to exchange data and commands between the two BT communicationmodules 1901 and 1903. For example, the BT communication module 1903 maysend a packet identifying characteristic ID <65533> and containing theSET command to write into the value field/buffer identified bycharacteristic ID <65533> which may then be read by the IoT deviceapplication logic 1902. To retrieve data from the IoT device 101, the BTcommunication module 1903 may transmit a GET command directed to thevalue field/buffer identified by characteristic ID <65534>. In responseto the GET command, the BT communication module 1901 may transmit anUPDATE packet to the BT communication module 1903 containing the datafrom the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID <65534>. Inaddition, UPDATE packets may be transmitted automatically, in responseto changes in a particular attribute on the IoT device 101. For example,if the IoT device is associated with a lighting system and the userturns on the lights, then an UPDATE packet may be sent to reflect thechange to the on/off attribute associated with the lighting application.

FIG. 20 illustrates exemplary packet formats used for GET, SET, andUPDATE in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. In oneembodiment, these packets are transmitted over the message write <65534>and message read <65533> channels following negotiation. In the GETpacket 2001, a first 1-byte field includes a value (0×10) whichidentifies the packet as a GET packet. A second 1-byte field includes arequest ID, which uniquely identifies the current GET command (i.e.,identifies the current transaction with which the GET command isassociated). For example, each instance of a GET command transmittedfrom a service or device may be assigned a different request ID. Thismay be done, for example, by incrementing a counter and using thecounter value as the request ID. However, the underlying principles ofthe invention are not limited to any particular manner for setting therequest ID.

A 2-byte attribute ID identifies the application-specific attribute towhich the packet is directed. For example, if the GET command is beingsent to IoT device 101 illustrated in FIG. 19, the attribute ID may beused to identify the particular application-specific value beingrequested. Returning to the above example, the GET command may bedirected to an application-specific attribute ID such as power status ofa lighting system, which comprises a value identifying whether thelights are powered on or off (e.g., 1=on, 0=off). If the IoT device 101is a security apparatus associated with a door, then the value field mayidentify the current status of the door (e.g., 1=opened, 0=closed). Inresponse to the GET command, a response may be transmitting containingthe current value identified by the attribute ID.

The SET packet 2002 and UPDATE packet 2003 illustrated in FIG. 20 alsoinclude a first 1-byte field identifying the type of packet (i.e., SETand UPDATE), a second 1-byte field containing a request ID, and a 2-byteattribute ID field identifying an application-defined attribute. Inaddition, the SET packet includes a 2-byte length value identifying thelength of data contained in an n-byte value data field. The value datafield may include a command to be executed on the IoT device and/orconfiguration data to configure the operation of the IoT device in somemanner (e.g., to set a desired parameter, to power down the IoT device,etc). For example, if the IoT device 101 controls the speed of a fan,the value field may reflect the current fan speed.

The UPDATE packet 2003 may be transmitted to provide an update of theresults of the SET command. The UPDATE packet 2003 includes a 2-bytelength value field to identify the length of the n-byte value data fieldwhich may include data related to the results of the SET command. Inaddition, a 1-byte update state field may identify the current state ofthe variable being updated. For example, if the SET command attempted toturn off a light controlled by the IoT device, the update state fieldmay indicate whether the light was successfully turned off.

FIG. 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions between theIoT service 120 and an IoT device 101 involving the SET and UPDATEcommands. Intermediary devices such as the IoT hub and the user's mobiledevice are not shown to avoid obscuring the underlying principles of theinvention. At 2101, the SET command 2101 is transmitted form the IoTservice to the IoT device 101 and received by the BT communicationmodule 1901 which responsively updates the GATT value buffer identifiedby the characteristic ID at 2102. The SET command is read from the valuebuffer by the low power microcontroller (MCU) 200 at 2103 (or by programcode being executed on the low power MCU such as IoT device applicationlogic 1902 shown in FIG. 19). At 2104, the MCU 200 or program codeperforms an operation in response to the SET command. For example, theSET command may include an attribute ID specifying a new configurationparameter such as a new temperature or may include a state value such ason/off (to cause the IoT device to enter into an “on” or a low powerstate). Thus, at 2104, the new value is set in the IoT device and anUPDATE command is returned at 2105 and the actual value is updated in aGATT value field at 2106. In some cases, the actual value will be equalto the desired value. In other cases, the updated value may be different(i.e., because it may take time for the IoT device 101 to update certaintypes of values). Finally, at 2107, the UPDATE command is transmittedback to the IoT service 120 containing the actual value from the GATTvalue field.

FIG. 22 illustrates a method for implementing a secure communicationchannel between an IoT service and an IoT device in accordance with oneembodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented within thecontext of the network architectures described above but is not limitedto any specific architecture.

At 2201, the IoT service creates an encrypted channel to communicatewith the IoT hub using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm(ECDSA) certificates. At 2202, the IoT service encrypts data/commands inIoT device packets using the a session secret to create an encrypteddevice packet. As mentioned above, the session secret may beindependently generated by the IoT device and the IoT service. At 2203,the IoT service transmits the encrypted device packet to the IoT hubover the encrypted channel. At 2204, without decrypting, the IoT hubpasses the encrypted device packet to the IoT device. At 22-5, the IoTdevice uses the session secret to decrypt the encrypted device packet.As mentioned, in one embodiment this may be accomplished by using thesecret and a counter value (provided with the encrypted device packet)to generate a key stream and then using the key stream to decrypt thepacket. At 2206, the IoT device then extracts and processes the dataand/or commands contained within the device packet.

Thus, using the above techniques, bi-directional, secure network socketabstractions may be established between two BT-enabled devices withoutformally pairing the BT devices using standard pairing techniques. Whilethese techniques are described above with respect to an IoT device 101communicating with an IoT service 120, the underlying principles of theinvention may be implemented to negotiate and establish a securecommunication channel between any two BT-enabled devices.

FIGS. 23A-C illustrate a detailed method for pairing devices inaccordance with one embodiment of the invention. The method may beimplemented within the context of the system architectures describedabove, but is not limited to any specific system architectures.

At 2301, the IoT Service creates a packet containing serial number andpublic key of the IoT Service. At 2302, the IoT Service signs the packetusing the factory private key. At 2303, the IoT Service sends the packetover an encrypted channel to the IoT hub and at 2304 the IoT hubforwards the packet to IoT device over an unencrypted channel. At 2305,the IoT device verifies the signature of packet and, at 2306, the IoTdevice generates a packet containing the serial number and public key ofthe IoT Device. At 2307, the IoT device signs the packet using thefactory private key and at 2308, the IoT device sends the packet overthe unencrypted channel to the IoT hub.

At 2309, the IoT hub forwards the packet to the IoT service over anencrypted channel and at 2310, the IoT Service verifies the signature ofthe packet. At 2311, the IoT Service generates a session key pair, andat 2312 the IoT Service generates a packet containing the session publickey. The IoT Service then signs the packet with IoT Service private keyat 2313 and, at 2314, the IoT Service sends the packet to the IoT hubover the encrypted channel.

Turning to FIG. 23B, the IoT hub forwards the packet to the IoT deviceover the unencrypted channel at 2315 and, at 2316, the IoT deviceverifies the signature of packet. At 2317 the IoT device generatessession key pair (e.g., using the techniques described above), and, at2318, an IoT device packet is generated containing the IoT devicesession public key. At 2319, the IoT device signs the IoT device packetwith IoT device private key. At 2320, the IoT device sends the packet tothe IoT hub over the unencrypted channel and, at 2321, the IoT hubforwards the packet to the IoT service over an encrypted channel.

At 2322, the IoT service verifies the signature of the packet (e.g.,using the IoT device public key) and, at 2323, the IoT service uses theIoT service private key and the IoT device public key to generate thesession secret (as described in detail above). At 2324, the IoT deviceuses the IoT device private key and IoT service public key to generatethe session secret (again, as described above) and, at 2325, the IoTdevice generates a random number and encrypts it using the sessionsecret. At 2326, the IoT service sends the encrypted packet to IoT hubover the encrypted channel. At 2327, the IoT hub forwards the encryptedpacket to the IoT device over the unencrypted channel. At 2328, the IoTdevice decrypts the packet using the session secret.

Turning to FIG. 23C, the IoT device re-encrypts the packet using thesession secret at 2329 and, at 2330, the IoT device sends the encryptedpacket to the IoT hub over the unencrypted channel. At 2331, the IoT hubforwards the encrypted packet to the IoT service over the encryptedchannel. The IoT service decrypts the packet using the session secret at2332. At 2333 the IoT service verifies that the random number matchesthe random number it sent. The IoT service then sends a packetindicating that pairing is complete at 2334 and all subsequent messagesare encrypted using the session secret at 2335.

Apparatus And Method For Sharing WiFi security data in an IoT System

As mentioned, certain IoT devices and IoT hubs may be configured toestablish communication channels over WiFi networks. When establishingsuch a connection over a secure WiFi network, a configuration must beperformed to provide the WiFi key to the IoT device/hub. The embodimentsof the invention described below include techniques for connecting anIoT hub to a secure WiFi channel by sharing security data such as a WiFikey, thereby simplifying the configuration process.

As illustrated in FIG. 24, one embodiment of the invention isimplemented within the context of an IoT hub 110 designed to connect aplurality of IoT devices 101-103 to an IoT service 120 over the Internet220 (as in prior embodiments described above). In one embodiment, thesecurity techniques described above are used to securely provide the IoThub 110 with a WiFi key and other data such as the SSID of for a localWiFi router 116. In one embodiment, to configure the IoT hub 110, an appon the client device 135 temporarily performs the functions of an IoThub to communicatively couple the IoT hub 110 to the IoT service. TheIoT hub 110 and IoT service 120 then establish a secure communicationchannel to provide the WiFi security data to the IoT hub as describedbelow.

In particular, FIG. 25 illustrates how the IoT hub 110 and IoT service120 include the various security components described above forestablishing a secure communication channel, including encryptionengines 1660-1661, secure key stores 1650-1651, KSGM modules 1640-1641,and HSM modules 1630-1631. These components operate substantially asdescribed above to securely connect the IoT hub 110 to the IoT service120. In one embodiment, a client app 2505 (or other program code)executed on the client device 135 includes hub/service connection logic2503 for establishing a communication channel between the IoT hub 110and the IoT service 120 and a security module 2502 for generating andsharing a secret used to encrypt the WiFi security data, as describedbelow. In one embodiment, the client device 130 forms a BTLE connectionwith the IoT hub 110 and a WiFi or cellular data connection with the IoTservice 120 to establish the connection between the IoT hub 110 and theIoT service 120.

As mentioned, in one embodiment, after the BTLE connection is formedbetween the IoT hub 110 and the client device 135 and the WiFi/cellularconnection is formed between the client device 135 and the IoT service120, the IoT service 120 authenticates with the IoT hub using the ECDHkey exchange techniques described above. In this embodiment, thehub/service connection logic 2503 on the client device 135 performs thesame or similar functions as the IoT hub described above (e.g., forminga two way communication channel to pass the data traffic between the IoThub 110 and the IoT service 120).

In one embodiment, a security module 2502 of the client app 2505generates a secret to be used for encryption and sends it to the IoT hubover the BTLE communication channel. In one embodiment, the secretcomprises a 32 byte random number (e.g., generated in a similar manneras the keystream described above). The secret may be sent in the clearin this embodiment because an attacker will not have access to theunderlying data to use it on (e.g., the WiFi key and associated data).

The client app 2505 then retrieves the WiFi key and other WiFi data(e.g., such as the SSID), encrypts it using the secret, and sends it tothe IoT service 120. In one embodiment, the client app 2505 requeststhis information directly from the user (e.g., asking the user to enterthe key via a GUI). In another embodiment, the client app 2505 retrievesit from a local secure storage following authentication by the end user.The IoT service 120 cannot read the WiFi key and other data because itdoes not have the secret generated by the security module 2502.

In one embodiment, the IoT service 120 then encrypts the (alreadyencrypted) key and other data and sends the twice-encrypted key/data tothe IoT hub 110 via the hub/service connection logic 2503. The clientapp 2505 of this embodiment cannot read this traffic because only theIoT service 120 and the IoT hub 110 have the session secret (see, e.g.,FIGS. 16A-23C and associated text). Thus, upon receipt of thetwice-encrypted key and other data, the IoT hub 110 decrypts thetwice-encrypted key/data using the session secret to generate theencrypted key/data (the version encrypted using the secret generated bythe security module 2502).

In one embodiment, WiFi data processing logic 2510 on the IoT hub thenuses the secret provided by the security module 2502 to decrypt theencrypted key and other data, resulting in a fully-decrypted WiFi keyand associated data. It may then use the WiFi key and data (e.g., theSSID of the WiFi router 116) to establish a secure communication channelwith the local WiFi router 116. It may then use this connection toconnect with the IoT service 120.

A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention isillustrated in FIG. 26. The method may be implemented within the contextof the system architectures described above, but is not limited to anyparticular architectures.

At 2601, the IoT service creates an encrypted communication channelusing a session secret to communicate with the IoT hub via a clientdevice. At 2602, the app on the client device generates a secret to beused for encryption and sends the secret to the IoT hub. At 2603, theapp on the client device retrieves the WiFi key, encrypts it using thesecret, and sends it to the IoT service. As mentioned, retrieving theWiFi key may involve the user manually entering the key or reading thekey from a secure storage on the client device.

At 2604, the IoT service encrypts the already-encrypted key to generatea twice-encrypted key and sends it to the IoT hub via the client deviceapp. At 2605, the IoT hub decrypts the twice-encrypted key using thesession secret used to form the secure communication channel between theIoT hub and the IoT service. The resulting encrypted key is the versionwhich was encrypted using the secret generated by the app on the clientdevice. At 2606, the IoT hub decrypts the encrypted key using the secretprovided by the app, resulting in an unencrypted key. Finally, at 2607,the IoT hub uses the unencrypted WiFi key to establish a secure WiFiconnection, which it uses to connect to the IoT service.

System and Method for Automatic Wireless Network Authentication in anInternet of Things (IoT) System

One embodiment of the invention implements techniques to securely andautomatically connect new IoT devices and IoT hubs to a WiFi router.This embodiment will initially be described with respect to FIG. 27which includes a master IoT hub 2716 which forms local wirelessconnections to one or more extender IoT hubs 2710-2711 and/or IoTdevices 105. As used herein, an “extender” IoT hub is one which extendsthe wireless range of the master IoT hub 2716 to connect IoT devices101-104 to the IoT system (e.g., IoT devices which are out of range ofthe master IoT hub 2716). For example, the IoT devices 101-104 may formBTLE connections with the IoT extender hubs 2710-2711 (using the varioustechniques described herein) and the extender IoT hubs 2710-2711 formWiFi connections to the master IoT hub 2716. As illustrated, the masterIoT hub 2716 may also form local wireless connections (e.g., BTLE orWiFi connections) directly to certain IoT devices 105 within range.

In addition to performing all of the functions of an IoT hub, oneembodiment of the master IoT hub 2716 is also a WiFi router whichconnects the various IoT devices 101-105 and IoT extender hubs 2710-2711to the IoT service 120 over the Internet 220. In one embodiment, themaster IoT hub 2716 includes an authentication module 2720 toauthenticate the various IoT devices 101-105 and extender IoT hubs2710-2711 on the local network. Specifically, in one embodiment, theauthentication module 2720 uses a hidden service set identifier (SS ID)with a known common name which is pre-programmed into the various IoTdevices 101-105 and extender IoT hubs 2710-2711. For example, an SSIDsuch as “_afero” may be used by the authentication module 2720 and eachIoT device 101-104 and extender IoT hub 2710-2711 may be pre-programmedwith this SSID so that these hubs/devices may automatically connect withthe master IoT hub 2716. In addition, the authentication logic 2720 mayrequire a security passphrase such as WPA2 passphrase. In oneembodiment, each IoT device 101-105 and extender IoT hub 2710-2711 isalso pre-programmed with this passphrase to automatically connect to themaster IoT hub 2716 during user installation.

In one embodiment, a firewall 2730 is implemented on the master IoT hub2716 to prevent all incoming connection requests and outgoing connectionrequests except those to a small set of servers within the IoT service120 (or other external services) having known host names. In thisembodiment, the IoT devices 101-105 may use the IoT service 120 throughthe master IoT hub 2716 but are not permitted to connect to any serversother than those programmed in the master IoT hub 2716. In this manner,the IoT devices 101-104 may be securely configured and connected to theIoT service 120 by an end user.

In addition, for an additional layer of security, the authenticationmodule 2720 or firewall 2730 may be programmed with a whitelistidentifying all IoT devices 101-105 and extender IoT hubs 2710-2711which are permitted to connect to the master IoT hub 2716. In oneembodiment, the medium access control (MAC) address of each authorizedIoT device 101-105 and extender IoT hub 2710-2711 are included in thewhitelist. Only those IoT devices and extender IoT hubs which are on thewhitelist are permitted to connect through the master IoT hub 2716. TheIoT service 120 may periodically update the whitelist as new IoT devices101-105 and extender IoT hubs 2710-2711 are provided to end users.

In one embodiment, an existing WiFi router may be configured to performthe various functions described herein. For example, the firewall 2730of a WiFi router may be programmed to block all incoming and outgoingconnections other than those from servers of the IoT service 120. Inaddition, the firewall 2730 may be configured to only allow connectionsfrom IoT devices and IoT extender hubs with MAC addresses on a whitelist(which, as described above, may be updated periodically or dynamicallyfrom the IoT service 120). In addition, the WiFi router may beprogrammed with a hidden SSID and passphrase pre-configured on the IoTdevices 101-105 and IoT extender hubs 2710-2711.

A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention isillustrated in FIG. 28. The method may be implemented on the systemarchitectures described above but is not limited to any particularsystem architecture.

At 2801, the master IoT hub is programmed with a hidden SSID andpassphrase. At 2802, one or more extender IoT hubs and/or IoT devicesconnect to the master IoT hub using the SSID and passphrase. At 2803,the firewall on the master IoT hub is programmed to block any incomingconnection requests and outgoing connection requests other than thosefor a specified set of servers (e.g., servers within the IoT service).At 2804, the IoT hub is programmed with a whitelist of MAC addresses ofIoT devices and/or extender IoT hubs. At 2805, an IoT device and/orextender IoT hub attempts to connect through the master IoT hub. If theconnection request is not directed to an authorized server (e.g., withinthe IoT service), determined at 2807, then the connection attempt isblocked at 2809. If the server is authorized, then at 2807, adetermination is made as to whether the MAC address of the IoT device orextender IoT hub is included in the whitelist. If not, then theconnection is blocked at 2809. If so, then the connection is establishedat 2808.

Association IDs and Attribute Classes

In one embodiment, to address this concern, an “association ID” isassociated with each device ID and used during the provisioning processto ensure that the device ID is never transmitted in the clear. Asillustrated in FIG. 29, in this embodiment, the association ID 2912 isincluded in the barcode/QR code printed on the IoT device 101 while thedevice ID 2911 is maintained securely within the secure wirelesscommunication module 2910 which implements the techniques describedabove to ensure secure communication with the IoT service 120. In oneembodiment, the association ID 2912 is an 8 byte ID like the device IDand is unique per IoT device. When a new IoT device 101 is provisionedin the system, the user scans the barcode/QR code containing theassociation ID 2912 with a user device 135 having an IoT app orapplication installed thereon. Alternatively, or in addition, the IoThub 110 may be used to capture the barcode/QR code including theassociation ID.

In either case, the association ID is transmitted to a deviceprovisioning module 2950 on the IoT service 120 which performs a lookupin a device database 2951 which includes an association between eachassociation ID and each device ID. The device provisioning module 2950uses the association ID 2912 to identify the device ID 2911 and thenuses the device ID to provision the new IoT device 101 in the system. Inparticular, once the device ID has been determined from the devicedatabase 2951, the device provisioning module 2950 transmits a commandto the IoT hubs 110 (which may include the user device 135) authorizingthe IoT hubs 110 to communicate with the IoT device 101 using the deviceID 2911.

In one embodiment, the association ID 2912 is generated at a factorywhen the IoT device 101 is manufactured (i.e., when the secure wirelesscommunication module 2910 is provisioned). Both the device ID 2911 andthe association ID 2912 may then be provided to the IoT service andstored within the device database 2951. As illustrated, the devicedatabase 2951 may include an indication specifying whether each devicehas been provisioned. By way of example, this may be a binary value witha first value (e.g., 1) indicating that the IoT device 101 isprovisioned and a second value (e.g., 0) indicating that the IoT deviceis not provisioned. Once the system has provisioned/registered the IoTdevice 101, the device ID may be used because the communication betweenthe IoT service 120 and IoT device 101 is protected using the securitytechniques described above.

In one embodiment, when a user sells an IoT device, the user may releasethe device ID by logging in to the IoT service 120 and releasing the IoTdevice from the user's account. The new user may then provision the IoTdevice and associate the IoT device with his/her account using thedevice provisioning techniques described herein.

A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention isillustrated in FIG. 30. The method may be implemented within the contextof the system architectures described above, but is not limited to anyparticular system architecture.

At 3001, an association is generated between a device ID and anassociation ID of an IoT device (e.g., at the factory at which the IoTdevice is manufactured). The association ID may be embedded within abarcode/QR code which is stamped on the IoT device. At 3002, theassociation between the device ID and association ID is stored on theIoT service. At 3003, the user purchases the new IoT device and scansthe barcode/QR code containing the association ID (e.g., via the user'smobile device with an app or application installed thereon or via an IoThub with a barcode reader).

At 3004, the association ID is transmitted to the IoT service and, at3005, the association ID is used to identify the device ID. At 3006, theIoT device is provisioned using the device ID. For example, the IoTdevice database may be updated to indicate that this particular deviceID has been provisioned and the IoT service may communicate the deviceID to IoT hubs, instructing the IoT hubs to communicate with the new IoTdevice.

FIG. 31 illustrates one embodiment of an IoT device which includes asecure wireless communication module 3118 which communicates with amicrocontroller unit (MCU) 3115 over a serial interface 3116 such as anSerial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus. The secure wireless communicationmodule 3118 manages the secure communication with the IoT service 120using the techniques described above and the MCU 3115 executes programcode to perform an application-specific function of the IoT device 101.

In one embodiment, various different classes of attributes are used tomanage the data collected by the IoT device and the system configurationrelated to the IoT device. In particular, in the example shown in FIG.31, the attributes include application attributes 3110, systemattributes 3111, and priority notification attributes 3112. In oneembodiment, the application attributes 3110 comprise attributes relatedto the application-specific function performed by the IoT device 101.For example, if the IoT device comprises a security sensor, then theapplication attributes 3110 may include a binary value indicatingwhether a door or window has been opened. If the IoT device comprises atemperature sensor, then the application attributes 3110 may include avalue indicating a current temperature. A virtually unlimited number ofother application-specific attributes may be defined. In one embodiment,the MCU 3115 executes application-specific program code and is onlyprovided with access to the application-specific attributes 3110. Forexample, an application developer may purchase the IoT device 101 withthe secure wireless communication module 3118 and design applicationprogram code to be executed by the MCU 3115. Consequently, theapplication developer will need to have access to application attributesbut will not need to have access to the other types of attributesdescribed below.

In one embodiment, the system attributes 3111 are used for definingoperational and configuration attributes for the IoT device 101 and theIoT system. For example, the system attributes may include networkconfiguration settings (e.g., such as the flow control parametersdiscussed above), the device ID, software versions, advertising intervalselection, security implementation features (as described above) andvarious other low level variables required to allow the IoT device 101to securely communicate with the IoT service.

In one embodiment, a set of priority notification attributes 3112 aredefined based on a level of importance or severity associated with thoseattributes. For example, if a particular attribute is associated with ahazardous condition such as a temperature value reaching a threshold(e.g., when the user accidentally leaves the stove on or when a heatsensor in the user's home triggers) then this attribute may be assignedto a priority notification attribute class. As mentioned above, prioritynotification attributes may be treated differently than otherattributes. For example, when a particular priority notificationattribute reaches a threshold, the IoT hub may pass the value of theattribute to the IoT service, regardless of the current flow controlmechanisms being implemented by the IoT hub. In one embodiment, thepriority notification attributes may also trigger the IoT service togenerate notifications to the user and/or alarm conditions within theuser's home or business (e.g., to alert the user of a potentiallyhazardous condition).

As illustrated in FIG. 31, in one embodiment, the current state of theapplication attributes 3110, system attributes 3111 and prioritynotification attributes 3112 are duplicated/mirrored within the devicedatabase 2851 on the IoT service 120. For example, when a change in oneof the attributes is updated on the IoT device 101, the secure wirelesscommunication module 3118 communicates the change to the devicemanagement logic 3021 on the IoT service 120, which responsively updatesthe value of the attribute within the device database 2851. In addition,when a user updates one of the attributes on the IoT service (e.g.,adjusting a current state or condition such as a desired temperature),the attribute change will be transmitted from the device managementlogic 3021 to the secure wireless communication module 3118 which willthen update its local copy of the attribute. In this way, the attributesare maintained in a consistent manner between the IoT device 101 and theIoT service 120. The attributes may also be accessed from the IoTservice 120 via a user device with an IoT app or application installedand/or by one or more external services 3170. As mentioned, the IoTservice 120 may expose an application programming interface (API) toprovide access to the various different classes of attributes.

In addition, in one embodiment, priority notification processing logic3022 may perform rule-based operations in response to receipt of anotification related to a priority notification attribute 3112. Forexample, if a priority notification attribute indicates a hazardouscondition (e.g., such as an iron or stove being left on by the user),then the priority notification processing logic 3022 may implement a setof rules to attempt to turn off the hazardous device (e.g., sending an“off” command to the device if possible). In one embodiment, thepriority notification processing logic 3022 may utilize other relateddata such as the current location of the user to determine whether toturn off the hazardous device (e.g., if the user is detected leaving thehome when the hazardous device in an “on” state). In addition, thepriority notification processing logic 3022 may transmit an alertcondition to the user's client device to notify the user of thecondition. Various other types of rule sets may be implemented by thepriority notification processing logic 3022 to attempt to address apotentially hazardous or otherwise undesirable condition.

Also shown in FIG. 31 is a set of BTLE attributes 3105 and an attributeaddress decoder 3107. In one embodiment, the BTLE attributes 3105 may beused to establish the read and write ports as described above. Theattribute address decoder 3107 reads a unique ID code associated witheach attribute to determine which attribute is beingreceived/transmitted and process the attribute accordingly (e.g.,identify where the attribute is stored within the secure wirelesscommunication module 3118).

Additional Embodiments for Sharing WiFi Credentials

The embodiments described below provide additional details a specificuse cases for sharing WiFi credentials and other secure data between twodevices. While these embodiments focus on an IoT implementation, theunderlying principles of the invention are not limited to IoT devicesand IoT hubs.

As described above with respect to FIGS. 24-28, a first device may sharea secret with a second device. The first device may then encrypt theWiFi credentials with the secret to generate first-encrypted credentialsand then encrypt the first-encrypted credentials with a session secretto generate second-encrypted credentials. It may then transmit thesecond-encrypted credentials to an Internet service (such as the IoTservice 120) which knows the session secret but does not know secretshared directly between the two devices.

For example, in an IoT context, it would be beneficial to securely sharea WiFi password stored on a first IoT device to a second IoT device thathas just been added to the user's account. The embodiments of theinvention do this in a way that the IoT service never has access to theWiFi password (because it does not know the shared secret).

One embodiment of the invention will be described with respect to FIG.32, where a user with an existing IoT device A 32101 and account withthe IoT service 32120 sets up a new IoT device B 32102. In oneembodiment, connection management circuitry/logic 3221 and 3222 ondevices A and B, respectively, implement the illustrated transactions.The connection management circuitry/logic 3221-3222 may be implementedin hardware, software, firmware or any combination thereof. Variouscomponents previously described, such as Bluetooth and WiFicommunication interfaces, are not illustrated in FIG. 32 to avoidobscuring the underlying principles of the invention.

The user's existing device A 32101 includes attribute data needed bydevice B to connect with a local WiFi router 116 (or WiFi access point).This attribute data may include network credentials such as an SSID nameand WiFi password/key of WiFi router 116. In addition, it is assumedthat device A 32101 is registered/provisioned with the user's account onthe IoT service 32120. For example, the configuration process describedherein may have been implemented previously to configure device A.

In one embodiment, connection management circuitry/logic (hereinafter“logic”) 3222 establishes a local wireless connection using a low-powershort range wireless protocol such as Bluetooth (e.g. BTLE). In theillustrated example, the user's mobile client device 135 (which supportsthe same local wireless protocol) is running an instance of the IoTservice app (previously described) which establishes the connection withIoT device B 32102 and also establishes a remote connection with the IoTservice 32120 via the WiFi router 116 or cellular data service, therebyacting as a hub for IoT device B 32102. In an alternate implementation,an IoT hub as described above may provide the local connectivity to IoTdevice B 32102.

Regardless of how the initial connection is made, a configurationrequest 3202 is sent from the mobile client 135 to the IoT service 32120which, in transaction 3203, transmits back a list of available deviceswhich may be used to configure IoT device B 32102. In particular, thelist of devices include those devices of the user which are alreadyconfigured for WiFi and are online. in one embodiment, the SSID of theWiFi router 116 is listed next to the device name to show the user whichnetwork it is on. In the illustrated example, the user selects device A32101 from the list at 3204. In response, a message is sent to device Aspecifying the device ID of device B 32102 and the attribute ID device Ashould transmit after linking is complete. In one embodiment, theattribute ID identifies a WiFi credentials attribute which stores theSSID and passcode for WiFi router 116. Referring again to FIG. 31, theWiFi credentials attribute may be a system attribute 3111 on device A32101.

While transaction 3205 is illustrated directly from the client 135 toIoT device A, this transaction may actually be transmitted to device Avia the IoT service 32120. The particular path taken by the transactionmessage is not relevant to the underlying principles of the invention.

At 3206, the connection management logic 3221 of device A initiates thelinking process by sending an “session info” message that contains thesource and destination addresses in the form of device IDs (i.e., fordevices A and B). Device B receives the message (via the IoT service32120) and, at 3207, its connection management logic 3222 transmits a“session info response” message 3207 to device A (also via the IoTservice 32120) which contains the destination device ID. The dataexchanged in the session info and session info response messages is usedas a shared secret for subsequent transactions.

At transaction 3208 device A 32101 uses the new shared secret to encryptthe attribute data identified by the attribute ID in transaction 3205.It then transmits the encrypted attribute data (including WiFicredentials) at 3209 (via an attribute UPDATE command as describedabove) and clears the shared secret at 3210.

At transaction 3211, IoT device B 32102 decrypts and stores theattribute data which, in a WiFi implementation, contains the WiFi SSIDand passcode. However, the attribute data may include any type of dataneeded to allow IoT device B 32102 to connect to the wireless network.Having used the shared secret to decrypt, IoT device B 32102 clears theshared secret at 3212 and configures the WiFi interface at 3213. Usingthe WiFi credentials, IoT device B 32102 connects to the WiFi router 116at 3214.

In one embodiment, a complete list of attribute IDs is sent to device Bin transaction 3205. Various techniques may be employed to ensure thatdevice B knows when device A is done sending the attributes. Forexample, the initial data packed may include a value indicating thenumber of attributes being sent. Alternatively, an end of messageencoding (e.g., a specified bit sequence) may be sent to notify device Bthat the transmission is complete. In any case, once the transmission iscomplete, device B will delete the shared secret (following decryption).

In addition, in one embodiment, device A and device B may exchange anyform of secret to securely transmit the network credentials as describedabove. This may include, for example, their session public keys, theirdevice keys, and/or a randomly generated key/nonce. The important thingis that devices A and B have a shared secret which they can use toencrypt the network credentials which may be transmitted through the IoTservice.

One embodiment of a method is illustrated in FIG. 33. The method may beimplemented within the context of the system architectures describedabove, but is not limited to any particular system architecture. Forexample, the techniques set forth in FIG. 33 may be used to sharenetwork credentials with any types of devices (not just IoT devices).

At 3301, a user has an existing WiFi device (device A) on their accountconfigured for their network. The network SSID (potentially a hiddenSSID as described above) and password are stored on device A. Asdescribed above, the service/cloud (hereinafter “service”) does not haveaccess to the password.

At 3302, the user adds a new WiFi device (device B) to their account.This may be accomplished, for example, by scanning a QR code on device Bwith the mobile device app, which securely transmits the code to theservice. In one embodiment, the code comprises an association ID whichthe service uses to identify the device (i.e., locate a correspondingdevice ID). The service locates device B in its database (ifpre-populated with devices) and associates the new device with theuser's account. Device B may initially establish a secure link to theservice using the various techniques described herein. For example, inone embodiment, the new device automatically searches for and connectsto a hub device and/or a mobile user device via Bluetooth, whichcommunicatively couples device B to the service.

Once device B is linked to the service, at 3303 the user is prompted toconfigure the device for their network. The user chooses “yes” from themobile device app which receives a list of available devices from theservice that are already configured for WiFi and are online. In oneembodiment, the configured SSID is listed next to the device name toshow the user which network it is on. In this example, device A islisted with the SSID of the WiFi network to which it is connected (e.g.,“ZZ WiFi”).

At 3304, the user chooses device A from the list. In response, a messageis sent to device A specifying the device ID of the device to link to(i.e., device B) and the attribute ID device A should transmit afterlinking is complete. At 3305, device A receives the message and beginsthe linking process by sending a message (e.g., a session info message3206 as previously described) that contains the source and destinationaddresses in the form of device IDs. This message may be sent over thestandard messaging channel.

At 3306 device B transmits a session info response message that containsthe destination device ID. Thus, linking is performed in a similarmanner to linking with the service, the primary difference being the newversions of the messages that contain source and destination addresses.

At 3307, device A uses the new shared secret to encrypt the attributedata from operation 3304 and sends an attribute UPDATE message toprovide the attribute data to device B (see, e.g., FIGS. 20-21 andassociated text). At 3308, once the attribute data has been sent, deviceA clears the shared secret. Once device B receives the attribute datacontaining the WiFi credentials, it uses the shared secret to decryptand store the WiFi credentials. Device B then clears the shared secret.

At 3309, device B configures the WiFi connection using the credentialsit received from device A. It then connects to the WiFi network usingthe credentials.

Embodiments of the invention may include various steps, which have beendescribed above. The steps may be embodied in machine-executableinstructions which may be used to cause a general-purpose orspecial-purpose processor to perform the steps. Alternatively, thesesteps may be performed by specific hardware components that containhardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any combination ofprogrammed computer components and custom hardware components.

As described herein, instructions may refer to specific configurationsof hardware such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs)configured to perform certain operations or having a predeterminedfunctionality or software instructions stored in memory embodied in anon-transitory computer readable medium. Thus, the techniques shown inthe figures can be implemented using code and data stored and executedon one or more electronic devices (e.g., an end station, a networkelement, etc.). Such electronic devices store and communicate(internally and/or with other electronic devices over a network) codeand data using computer machine-readable media, such as non-transitorycomputer machine-readable storage media (e.g., magnetic disks; opticaldisks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices;phase-change memory) and transitory computer machine-readablecommunication media (e.g., electrical, optical, acoustical or other formof propagated signals—such as carrier waves, infrared signals, digitalsignals, etc.). In addition, such electronic devices typically include aset of one or more processors coupled to one or more other components,such as one or more storage devices (non-transitory machine-readablestorage media), user input/output devices (e.g., a keyboard, atouchscreen, and/or a display), and network connections. The coupling ofthe set of processors and other components is typically through one ormore busses and bridges (also termed as bus controllers). The storagedevice and signals carrying the network traffic respectively representone or more machine-readable storage media and machine-readablecommunication media. Thus, the storage device of a given electronicdevice typically stores code and/or data for execution on the set of oneor more processors of that electronic device. Of course, one or moreparts of an embodiment of the invention may be implemented usingdifferent combinations of software, firmware, and/or hardware.

Throughout this detailed description, for the purposes of explanation,numerous specific details were set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, toone skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced without someof these specific details. In certain instances, well known structuresand functions were not described in elaborate detail in order to avoidobscuring the subject matter of the present invention. Accordingly, thescope and spirit of the invention should be judged in terms of theclaims which follow.

1. (canceled)
 2. A method comprising: establishing a short range localwireless connection between a first Internet of things (IoT) device anda mobile device having an IoT app installed, the mobile device to couplethe first IoT device to an IoT service; receiving, on the IoT app, arequest from a user of the mobile device to configure the first IoTdevice to connect to a secure network using network credentials;transmit the request from the mobile device to the IoT service;receiving a list of IoT devices registered with an account of the useron the IoT service, the list comprising one or more IoT devicesincluding a second IoT device that is previously registered with anaccount of the user on the IoT service and configured to connect to thesecure network with the network credentials, the user to selected thesecond IoT device from the list; transmit a network credential requestto the second IoT device, the network credential request comprising adevice identifier (ID) of the first IoT device and an attribute IDassociated with the network credential; establishing a communicationchannel between the first IoT device and the second IoT device throughthe mobile device; implementing a sequence of security transactionsbetween the first IoT device and second IoT device to determine a sharedsecret; encrypting the network credentials at the second IoT deviceusing the shared secret to generate encrypted network credentials;transmitting the encrypted network credentials to the first IoT deviceover the communication channel; decrypting the encrypted networkcredentials at the first IoT device using the shared secret to generatedecrypted network credentials; and using the decrypted networkcredentials at the first IoT device to securely connect to the securenetwork.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the secure network comprisesa WiFi network and the network credentials comprise a passcode and aService Set Identifier (SSID).
 4. The method of claim 3, wherein theSSID and passcode are stored in at least one attribute on the second IoTdevice, the second IoT device to encrypt the at least one attribute andtransmit the encrypted attribute to the first IoT device with anattribute UPDATE command.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the firstIoT device is to decrypt the at least one attribute using the sharedsecret to generate at least one decrypted attribute, the first IoTdevice to store the at least one decrypted attribute prior to using theSSID and passcode to connect to the WiFi network.
 6. The method of claim5, further comprising: associating the first IoT device with the user'saccount on the IoT service.
 7. The method of claim 6, furthercomprising: clearing the shared secret on the second IoT device aftertransmitting the encrypted network credentials to the first IoT device.8. The method of claim 7, further comprising: clearing the shared secreton the first IoT device after decrypting the encrypted networkcredentials at the first IoT device using the shared secret.
 9. Themethod of claim 8, wherein the sequence of security transactions betweenthe first IoT device and second IoT device comprise a key exchangeprotocol usable to determine the shared secret at both the first IoTdevice and the second IoT device.
 10. A non-transitory machine-readablemedium having program code stored thereon which, when executed by one ormore machines, causes the machines to perform operations of:establishing a short range local wireless connection between a firstInternet of things (IoT) device and a mobile device having an IoT appinstalled, the mobile device to couple the first IoT device to an IoTservice; receiving, on the IoT app, a request from a user of the mobiledevice to configure the first IoT device to connect to a secure networkusing network credentials; transmit the request from the mobile deviceto the IoT service; receiving a list of IoT devices registered with anaccount of the user on the IoT service, the list comprising one or moreIoT devices including a second IoT device that is previously registeredwith an account of the user on the IoT service and configured to connectto the secure network with the network credentials, the user to selectedthe second IoT device from the list; transmit a network credentialrequest to the second IoT device, the network credential requestcomprising a device identifier (ID) of the first IoT device and anattribute ID associated with the network credential; establishing acommunication channel between the first IoT device and the second IoTdevice through the mobile device; implementing a sequence of securitytransactions between the first IoT device and second IoT device todetermine a shared secret; encrypting the network credentials at thesecond IoT device using the shared secret to generate encrypted networkcredentials; transmitting the encrypted network credentials to the firstIoT device over the communication channel; decrypting the encryptednetwork credentials at the first IoT device using the shared secret togenerate decrypted network credentials; and using the decrypted networkcredentials at the first IoT device to securely connect to the securenetwork.
 11. The machine-readable medium of claim 10, wherein the securenetwork comprises a WiFi network and the network credentials comprise apasscode and a Service Set Identifier (SSID).
 12. The machine-readablemedium of claim 11, wherein the SSID and passcode are stored in at leastone attribute on the second IoT device, wherein the second IoT device isto encrypt the at least one attribute and transmit the encryptedattribute to the first IoT device with an attribute UPDATE command. 13.The machine-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the first IoT device isto decrypt the at least one attribute using the shared secret togenerate at least one decrypted attribute, the first IoT device to storethe at least one decrypted attribute prior to using the SSID andpasscode to connect to the WiFi network.
 14. The machine-readable mediumof claim 13, wherein the operations further comprise: associating thefirst IoT device with the user's account on the IoT service.
 15. Themachine-readable medium of claim 14, wherein the operations furthercomprise: clearing the shared secret on the second IoT device aftertransmitting the encrypted network credentials to the first IoT device.16. The machine-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the operationsfurther comprise: clearing the shared secret on the first IoT deviceafter decrypting the encrypted network credentials at the first IoTdevice using the shared secret.
 17. The machine-readable medium of claim10, wherein the sequence of security transactions between the first IoTdevice and second IoT device comprise a key exchange protocol usable todetermine the shared secret at both the first IoT device and the secondIoT device.
 18. A system including a first Internet of Things (IoT)device, a second IoT device, an IoT service, and an IoT app installed ona mobile device, the system further including circuitry and program codeto securely provide network credentials from the second IoT device tothe first IoT device, wherein: the IoT app is to: receive a request froma user of the mobile device to configure the first IoT device to connectto a secure network using network credentials; transmit the request fromthe mobile device to the IoT service; receive, from the IoT service, alist of IoT devices registered with an account of the user on the IoTservice, the list comprising one or more IoT devices including thesecond IoT device that is previously registered with an account of theuser on the IoT service and configured to connect to the secure networkwith the network credentials, the user to selected, on the IoT app, thesecond IoT device from the list; transmit a network credential requestto the second device, the network credential request comprising a deviceidentifier (ID) of the first IoT device and an attribute ID associatedwith the network credential; and establish a communication channelbetween the first IoT device and the second IoT device through themobile device; connection management logic on the first and second IoTdevices is to implement a sequence of security transactions between thefirst IoT device and second IoT device to determine a shared secret; thesecond IoT device is to encrypt the network credentials using the sharedsecret to generate encrypted network credentials and to transmit theencrypted network credentials to the first IoT device over thecommunication channel; and the first IoT device is to decrypt theencrypted network credentials using the shared secret to generatedecrypted network credentials and to securely connect to the securenetwork using the decrypted network credentials.
 19. The system of claim18, wherein the secure network comprises a WiFi network and the networkcredentials comprise a passcode and a Service Set Identifier (SSID). 20.The system of claim 19, wherein the SSID and passcode are stored in atleast one attribute on the second IoT device, wherein the second IoTdevice is to encrypt the at least one attribute and transmit theencrypted attribute to the first IoT device with an attribute UPDATEcommand.
 21. The system of claim 20, wherein the first IoT device is todecrypt the at least one attribute using the shared secret to generateat least one decrypted attribute, the first IoT device to store the atleast one decrypted attribute prior to using the SSID and passcode toconnect to the WiFi network.
 22. The system of claim 21, wherein the IoTservice is to associate the first IoT device with the user's account onthe IoT service.
 23. The system of claim 22, wherein the second IoTdevice is to clear the shared secret on the second IoT device aftertransmitting the encrypted network credentials to the first IoT device.24. The system of claim 23, wherein the first IoT device is to clear theshared secret on the first IoT device after decrypting the encryptednetwork credentials at the first IoT device using the shared secret. 25.The system of claim 18, wherein the sequence of security transactionsbetween the first IoT device and second IoT device comprise a keyexchange protocol usable to determine the shared secret at both thefirst IoT device and the second IoT device.